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## *THE RELIGION OF THE FUTURE*<sup>1</sup>

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As students in this summer's School of Theology you have attended a series of lectures on fluctuations in religious interest, on the frequent occurrence of religious declines followed soon by recoveries or regenerations both within and without the churches, on the frequent attempts to bring the prevalent religious doctrines into harmony with new tendencies in the intellectual world, on the constant struggle between conservatism and liberalism in existing churches and between idealism and materialism in society at large, on the effects of popular education and the modern spirit of inquiry on religious doctrines and organizations, on the changed views of thinking people concerning the nature of the world and of man, on the increase of knowledge as affecting religion, and on the new ideas of God. You have also listened to lectures on psychotherapy, a new development of an ancient tendency to mix religion with medicine, and on the theory of evolution, a modern scientific doctrine which within fifty years has profoundly modified the religious conceptions and expectations of many thinking people. You have heard, too, how the new ideas of democracy and social progress have modified and ought to modify not only the actual work done by the churches, but the whole conception of the function of churches. Again, you have heard how many and how profound are the

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religious implications in contemporary philosophy. Your attention has been called to the most recent views concerning the conservation of energy in the universe, to the wonderful phenomena of radio-activity, and to the most recent definitions of atom, molecule, ion, and electron—human imaginings which have much to do with the modern conceptions of matter and spirit. The influence on popular religion of modern scholarship applied to the New Testament has also engaged your attention; and, finally, you have heard an exposition of religious conditions and practices in the United States which assumed an intimate connection between the advance of civilization and the contemporaneous aspects of religions, and illustrated from history the service of religion—and particularly of Christianity—to the progress of civilization through its contributions to individual freedom, intellectual culture, and social coöperation.

The general impression you have received from this comprehensive survey must surely be that religion is not a fixed, but a fluent thing. It is, therefore, wholly natural and to be expected that the conceptions of religion prevalent among educated people should change from century to century. Modern studies in comparative religion and in the history of religions demonstrate that such has been the case in times past. Now the nineteenth century immeasurably surpassed all preceding centuries in the increase of knowledge, and in the spread of the spirit of scientific inquiry and of the passion for truth-seeking. Hence the changes in religious beliefs and practices, and in the relation of churches to human society as a whole, were much deeper and more extensive in that century than ever before in the history of the world; and the approach made to the embodiment in the actual practices of mankind of the doctrines of the greatest religious teachers was more significant and more rapid than ever before. The religion of a multitude of humane persons in the twentieth century may, therefore, be called without inexcusable exaggeration a "new religion,"—not that a single one of its doctrines and practices is really new in essence, but only that the wider acceptance and better actual application of truths familiar in the past at many times and places, but never taken to heart by the multitude or put in force on a large scale, are new. I shall



attempt to state without reserve and in simplest terms free from technicalities, first, what the religion of the future seems likely not to be, and secondly, what it may reasonably be expected to be. My point of view is that of an American layman, whose observing and thinking life has covered the extraordinary period since the *Voyage of the Beagle* was published, anaesthesia and the telegraph came into use, Herbert Spencer issued his first series of papers on evolution, Kuenen, Robertson Smith, and Wellhausen developed and vindicated Biblical criticism, J. S. Mill's *Principles of Political Economy* appeared, and the United States by going to war with Mexico set in operation the forces which abolished slavery on the American continent—the period within which mechanical power came to be widely distributed through the explosive engine and the applications of electricity, and all the great fundamental industries of civilized mankind were reconstructed.

(1) The religion of the future will not be based on authority, either spiritual or temporal. The decline of the reliance upon absolute authority is one of the most significant phenomena of the modern world. This decline is to be seen everywhere,—in government, in education, in the church, in business, and in the family. The present generation is willing, and indeed often eager, to be led; but it is averse to being driven, and it wants to understand the grounds and sanctions of authoritative decisions. As a rule, the Christian churches, Roman, Greek, and Protestant, have heretofore relied mainly upon the principle of authority, the Reformation having substituted for an authoritative church an authoritative book; but it is evident that the authority both of the most authoritative churches and of the Bible as a verbally inspired guide is already greatly impaired, and that the tendency towards liberty is progressive, and among educated men irresistible.

(2) It is hardly necessary to say that in the religion of the future there will be no personifications of the primitive forces of nature, such as light, fire, frost, wind, storm, and earthquake, although primitive religions and the actual religions of barbarous or semi-civilized peoples abound in such personifications. The mountains, groves, volcanoes, and oceans will no longer be inhabited by either kindly or malevolent deities; although man will still look



to the hills for rest, still find in the ocean a symbol of infinity, and refreshment and delight in the forests and the streams. The love of nature mounts and spreads, while faith in fairies, imps, nymphs, demons, and angels declines and fades away.

(3) There will be in the religion of the future no worship, express or implied, of dead ancestors, teachers, or rulers; no more tribal, racial, or tutelary gods; no identification of any human being, however majestic in character, with the Eternal Deity. In these respects the religion of the future will not be essentially new, for nineteen centuries ago Jesus said, "Neither in this mountain, nor in Jerusalem, shall ye worship the Father. . . . God is a Spirit; and they that worship him must worship in spirit and truth." It should be recognized, however, first, that Christianity was soon deeply affected by the surrounding paganism, and that some of these pagan intrusions have survived to this day; and secondly, that the Hebrew religion, the influence of which on the Christian has been, and is, very potent, was in the highest degree a racial religion, and its Holy of Holies was local. In war-times, that is, in times when the brutal or savage instincts remaining in humanity become temporarily dominant, and goodwill is limited to people of the same nation, the survival of a tribal or national quality in institutional Christianity comes out very plainly. The aid of the Lord of Hosts is still invoked by both parties to international warfare, and each side praises and thanks Him for its successes. Indeed, the same spirit has often been exhibited in civil wars caused by religious differences.

"Now glory to the Lord of Hosts, from whom all glories are!  
And glory to our sovereign liege, King Henry of Navarre!"

It is not many years since an Archbishop of Canterbury caused thanks to be given in all Anglican churches that the Lord of Hosts had been in the English camp over against the Egyptians. Heretofore the great religions of the world have held out hopes of direct interventions of the deity, or some special deity, in favor of his faithful worshippers. It was the greatest of Jewish prophets who told King Hezekiah that the King of Assyria, who had approached Jerusalem with a great army, should not come into



the city nor shoot an arrow there, and reported the Lord as saying, "I will defend this city to save it, for my own sake, and for my servant David's sake." "And it came to pass that night, that the angel of the Lord went forth, and smote in the camp of the Assyrians an hundred fourscore and five thousand: and when men arose early in the morning, behold, they were all dead corpses." The new religion cannot promise that sort of aid to either nations or individuals in peril.

(4) In the religious life of the future the primary object will not be the personal welfare or safety of the individual in this world or any other. That safety, that welfare or salvation, may be incidentally secured, but it will not be the prime object in view. The religious person will not think of his own welfare or security, but of service to others, and of contributions to the common good. The new religion will not teach that character is likely to be suddenly changed, either in this world or in any other, —although in any world a sudden opportunity for improvement may present itself, and the date of that opportunity may be a precious remembrance. The new religion will not rely on either a sudden conversion in this world or a sudden paradise in the next, from out a sensual, selfish, or dishonest life. It will teach that repentance wipes out nothing in the past, and is only the first step towards reformation, and a sign of a better future.

(5) The religion of the future will not be propitiatory, sacrificial, or expiatory. In primitive society fear of the supernal powers, as represented in the awful forces of nature, was the root of religion. These dreadful powers must be propitiated or placated, and they must be propitiated by sacrifices in the most literal sense; and the supposed offences of man must be expiated by sufferings, which were apt to be vicarious. Even the Hebrews offered human sacrifices for generations; and always a great part of their religious rites consisted in sacrifices of animals. The Christian church made a great step forward when it substituted the burning of incense for the burning of bullocks and doves; but to this day there survives not only in the doctrines but in the practices of the Christian church the principle of expiatory sacrifice. It will be an immense advance if twentieth-century Christianity can be purified from all these survivals of barbarous, or

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semi-barbarous, religious conceptions, because they imply such an unworthy idea of God.

(6) The religion of the future will not perpetuate the Hebrew anthropomorphic representations of God, conceptions which were carried in large measure into institutional Christianity. It will not think of God as an enlarged and glorified man, who walks "in the garden in the cool of the day," or as a judge deciding between human litigants, or as a king, Pharaoh, or emperor, ruling arbitrarily his subjects, or as the patriarch who, in the early history of the race, ruled his family absolutely. These human functions will cease to represent adequately the attributes of God. The nineteenth century has made all these conceptions of deity look archaic and crude.

(7) The religion of the future will not be gloomy, ascetic, or maledictory. It will not deal chiefly with sorrow and death, but with joy and life. It will not care so much to account for the evil and the ugly in the world as to interpret the good and the beautiful. It will believe in no malignant powers—neither in Satan nor in witches, neither in the evil eye nor in the malign suggestion. When its disciple encounters a wrong or evil in the world, his impulse will be to search out its origin, source, or cause, that he may attack it at its starting-point. He may not speculate on the origin of evil in general, but will surely try to discover the best way to eradicate the particular evil or wrong he has recognized.

Having thus considered what the religion of the future will not be, let us now consider what its positive elements will be.

The new thought of God will be its most characteristic element. This ideal will comprehend the Jewish Jehovah, the Christian Universal Father, the modern physicist's omnipresent and exhaustless Energy, and the biological conception of a Vital Force. The Infinite Spirit pervades the universe, just as the spirit of a man pervades his body, and acts, consciously or unconsciously, in every atom of it. The twentieth century will accept literally and implicitly St. Paul's statement, "In Him we live, and move, and have our being," and God is that vital atmosphere, or incessant inspiration. The new religion is therefore thoroughly mono-



theistic, its God being the one infinite force; but this one God is not withdrawn or removed, but indwelling, and especially dwelling in every living creature. God is so absolutely immanent in all things, animate and inanimate, that no mediation is needed between him and the least particle of his creation. In his moral attributes, he is for every man the multiplication to infinity of all the noblest, tenderest, and most potent qualities which that man has ever seen or imagined in a human being. In this sense every man makes his own picture of God. Every age, barbarous or civilized, happy or unhappy, improving or degenerating, frames its own conception of God within the limits of its own experiences and imaginings. In this sense, too, a humane religion has to wait for a humane generation. The central thought of the new religion will therefore be a humane and worthy idea of God, thoroughly consistent with the nineteenth-century revelations concerning man and nature, and with all the tenderest and love-liest teachings which have come down to us from the past.

The scientific doctrine of one omnipresent, eternal Energy, informing and inspiring the whole creation at every instant of time and throughout the infinite spaces, is fundamentally and completely inconsistent with the dualistic conception which sets spirit over against matter, good over against evil, man's wickedness against God's righteousness, and Satan against Christ. The doctrine of God's immanence is also inconsistent with the conception that he once set the universe a-going, and then withdrew, leaving the universe to be operated under physical laws, which were his vicegerents or substitutes. If God is thoroughly immanent in the entire creation, there can be no "secondary causes," in either the material or the spiritual universe. The new religion rejects absolutely the conception that man is an alien in the world, or that God is alienated from the world. It rejects also the entire conception of man as a fallen being, hopelessly wicked, and tending downward by nature; and it makes this emphatic rejection of long-accepted beliefs because it finds them all inconsistent with a humane, civilized, or worthy idea of God.

If, now, man discovers God through self-consciousness, or, in other words, if it is the human soul through which God is revealed, the race has come to the knowledge of God through knowledge



of itself; and the best knowledge of God comes through knowledge of the best of the race. Men have always attributed to man a spirit distinct from his body, though immanent in it. No one of us is willing to identify himself with his body; but on the contrary every one now believes, and all men have believed, that there is in a man an animating, ruling, characteristic essence, or spirit, which is himself. This spirit, dull or bright, petty or grand, pure or foul, looks out of the eyes, sounds in the voice, and appears in the bearing and manners of each individual. It is something just as real as the body, and more characteristic. To every influential person it gives far the greater part of his power. It is what we call the personality. This spirit, or soul, is the most effective part of every human being, and is recognized as such, and always has been. It can use a fine body more effectively than it can a poor body, but it can do wonders through an inadequate body. In the crisis of a losing battle, it is a human soul that rallies the flying troops. It looks out of flashing eyes, and speaks in ringing tones, but its appeal is to other souls, and not to other bodies. In the midst of terrible natural catastrophes,—earthquakes, storms, conflagrations, volcanic eruptions,—when men's best works are being destroyed and thousands of lives are ceasing suddenly and horribly, it is not a few especially good human bodies which steady the survivors, maintain order, and organize the forces of rescue and relief. It is a few superior souls. The leading men and women in any society, savage or civilized, are the strongest personalities,—the personality being primarily spiritual, and only secondarily bodily. Recognizing to the full these simple and obvious facts, the future religion will pay homage to all righteous and loving persons who in the past have exemplified, and made intelligible to their contemporaries, intrinsic goodness and effluent good-will. It will be an all-saints religion. It will treasure up all tales of human excellence and virtue. It will reverence the discoverers, teachers, martyrs, and apostles of liberty, purity, and righteousness. It will respect and honor all strong and lovely human beings,—seeing in them in finite measure qualities similar to those which they adore in God. Recognizing in every great and lovely human person an individual will-power which is the essence of the personality, it will naturally and inevitably attribute



to God a similar individual will-power, the essence of his infinite personality. In this simple and natural faith there will be no place for metaphysical complexities or magical rites, much less for obscure dogmas, the result of compromises in turbulent conventions. It is anthropomorphic; but what else can a human view of God's personality be? The finite can study and describe the infinite only through analogy, parallelism, and simile; but that is a good way. The new religion will animate and guide ordinary men and women who are putting into practice religious conceptions which result directly from their own observation and precious experience of tenderness, sympathy, trust, and solemn joy. It will be most welcome to the men and women who cherish and exhibit incessant, all-comprehending good-will. These are the "good" people. These are the only genuinely civilized persons.

To the wretched, sick, and downtrodden of the earth, religion has in the past held out hopes of future compensation. When precious ties of affection have been broken, religion has held out prospects of immediate and eternal blessings for the departed; and has promised happy reunions in another and a better world. To a human soul, lodged in an imperfect, feeble, or suffering body, some of the older religions have held out the expectation of deliverance by death, and of entrance upon a rich, competent, and happy life,—in short, for present human ills, however crushing, the widely accepted religions have offered either a second life, presumably immortal, under the happiest conditions, or at least peace, rest, and a happy oblivion. Can the future religion promise that sort of compensation for the ills of this world, any more than it can promise miraculous aid against threatened disaster? A candid reply to this inquiry involves the statement that in the future religion there will be nothing "supernatural." This does not mean that life will be stripped of mystery or wonder, or that the range of natural law has been finally determined; but that religion, like all else, must conform to natural law so far as the range of law has been determined. In this sense the religion of the future will be a natural religion. In all its theory and all its practice it will be completely natural. It will place no reliance on any sort of magic, or miracle, or other violation



of, or exception to, the laws of nature. It will perform no magical rites, use no occult processes, count on no abnormal interventions of supernal powers, and admit no possession of supernatural gifts, whether transmitted or conferred, by any tribe, class, or family of men. Its sacraments will be, not invasions of law by miracle, but the visible signs of a natural spiritual grace, or of a natural hallowed custom. It may preserve historical rites and ceremonies, which, in times past, have represented the expectation of magical or miraculous effects; but it will be content with natural interpretations of such rites and ceremonies. Its priests will be men especially interested in religious thought, possessing unusual gifts of speech on devotional subjects, and trained in the best methods of improving the social and industrial conditions of human life. There will always be need of such public teachers and spiritual leaders, heralds, and prophets. It should be observed, however, that many happenings and processes which were formerly regarded as supernatural have, with the increase of knowledge, come to be regarded as completely natural. The line between the supposed natural and the supposed supernatural is, therefore, not fixed but changeable.

It is obvious, therefore, that the completely natural quality of the future religion excludes from it many of the religious compensations and consolations of the past. Twentieth-century soldiers, going into battle, will not be able to say to each other, as Moslem soldiers did in the tenth century, "If we are killed today, we shall meet again tonight in Paradise." Even now, the mother who loses her babe, or the husband his wife, by a preventable disease, is seldom able to say simply, "It is the will of God! The babe—or the woman—is better off in heaven than on earth. I resign this dear object of love and devotion, who has gone to a happier world." The ordinary consolations of institutional Christianity no longer satisfy intelligent people whose lives are broken by the sickness or premature death of those they love. The new religion will not attempt to reconcile men and women to present ills by promises of future blessedness, either for themselves or for others. Such promises have done infinite mischief in the world, by inducing men to be patient under sufferings or deprivations against which they should have incessantly struggled. The



advent of a just freedom for the mass of mankind has been delayed for centuries by just this effect of compensatory promises issued by churches.

The religion of the future will approach the whole subject of evil from another side, that of resistance and prevention. The Breton sailor, who had had his arm poisoned by a dirty fish-hook which had entered his finger, made a votive offering at the shrine of the Virgin Mary, and prayed for a cure. The workman today, who gets cut or bruised by a rough or dirty instrument, goes to a surgeon, who applies an antiseptic dressing to the wound, and prevents the poisoning. That surgeon is one of the ministers of the new religion. When dwellers in a slum suffer the familiar evils caused by overcrowding, impure food, and cheerless labor, the modern true believers contend against the sources of such misery by providing public baths, playgrounds, wider and cleaner streets, better dwellings, and more effective schools,—that is, they attack the sources of physical and moral evil. The new religion cannot supply the old sort of consolation; but it can diminish the need of consolation, or reduce the number of occasions for consolation.

A further change in religious thinking has already occurred on the subject of human pain. Pain was generally regarded as a punishment for sin, or as a means of moral training, or as an expiation, vicarious or direct. Twentieth-century religion, gradually perfected in this respect during the last half of the nineteenth century, regards human pain as an evil to be relieved and prevented by the promptest means possible, and by any sort of available means, physical, mental, or moral; and, thanks to the progress of biological and chemical science, there is comparatively little physical pain nowadays which cannot be prevented or relieved. The invention of anaesthetics has brought into contempt the expiatory, or penal, view of human pain in this world. The younger generations listen with incredulous smiles to the objection made only a little more than sixty years ago by some divines of the Scottish Presbyterian church to the employment of chloroform in childbirth, namely, that the physicians were interfering with the execution of a curse pronounced by the Almighty. Dr. Weir Mitchell, a physician who has seen much of mental pain



as well as of bodily, in his poem read at the fiftieth anniversary of the first public demonstration of surgical anaesthesia, said of pain:

“What purpose hath it? Nay, thy quest is vain:  
Earth hath no answer: If the baffled brain  
Cries, 'Tis to warn, to punish, Ah, refrain!  
When writhes the child, beneath the surgeon's hand,  
What soul shall hope that pain to understand?  
Lo! Science falters o'er the hopeless task,  
And Love and Faith in vain an answer ask.” . . .

A similar change is occurring in regard to the conception of divine justice. The evils in this world have been regarded as penalties inflicted by a just God on human beings who had violated his laws; and the justice of God played a great part in his imagined dealings with the human race. A young graduate of Andover Theological Seminary once told me that when he had preached two or three times in summer in a small Congregational church on Cape Cod, one of the deacons of the church said to him at the close of the service, “What sort of sentimental mush is this that they are teaching you at Andover? You talk every Sunday about the love of God; we want to hear about his justice.” The future religion will not undertake to describe, or even imagine, the justice of God. We are today so profoundly dissatisfied with human justice, although it is the result of centuries of experience of social good and ill in this world, that we may well distrust human capacity to conceive of the justice of a morally perfect, infinite being. The civilized nations now recognize the fact that legal punishments usually fail of their objects, or cause wrongs and evils greater than those for which the punishments were inflicted; so that penology, or the science of penalties, has still to be created. It is only very lately that the most civilized communities began to learn how to deal with criminal tendencies in the young. In the eyes of God human beings must all seem very young. Since our ideas of God's modes of thinking and acting are necessarily based on the best human attainments in similar directions, the new religion cannot pretend to understand God's justice, inasmuch as there is no human experience of public justice fit to serve as the foundation for a true conception of God's. The new religion will



magnify and laud God's love and compassion, and will not venture to state what the justice of God may, or may not, require of himself, or of any of his finite creatures. This will be one of the great differences between the future religion and the past. Institutional Christianity as a rule condemned the mass of mankind to eternal torment; partly because the leaders of the churches thought they understood completely the justice of God, and partly because the exclusive possession of means of deliverance gave the churches some restraining influence over even the boldest sinners, and much over the timid. The new religion will make no such pretensions, and will teach no such horrible and perverse doctrines.

Do you ask what consolation for human ills the new religion will offer? I answer, the consolation which often comes to the sufferer from being more serviceable to others than he was before the loss or the suffering for which consolation is needed; the consolation of being one's self wiser and tenderer than before, and therefore more able to be serviceable to human kind in the best ways; the consolation through the memory, which preserves the sweet fragrance of characters and lives no longer in presence, recalls the joys and achievements of those lives while still within mortal view, and treasures up and multiplies the good influences they exerted. Moreover, such a religion has no tendency to diminish the force in this world, or any other, of the best human imaginings concerning the nature of the infinite Spirit immanent in the universe. It urges its disciples to believe that as the best and happiest man is he who best loves and serves, so the soul of the universe finds its perfect bliss and efficiency in supreme and universal love and service. It sees evidence in the moral history of the human race that a loving God rules the universe. Trust in this supreme rule is genuine consolation and support under many human trials and sufferings. Nevertheless, although brave and patient endurance of evils is always admirable, and generally happier than timid or impatient conduct under suffering or wrong, it must be admitted that endurance or constancy is not consolation, and that there are many physical and mental disabilities and injuries for which there is no consolation in a literal sense. Human skill may mitigate or palliate some of them, human sympathy and kindness may make them more



bearable, but neither religion nor philosophy offers any complete consolation for them, or ever has.

In thus describing the consolations for human woes and evils which such a religion can offer, its chief motives have been depicted. They are just those which Jesus said summed up all the commandments, love toward God and brotherliness to man. It will teach a universal good-will, under the influence of which men will do their duty, and at the same time, promote their own happiness. The devotees of a religion of service will always be asking what they can contribute to the common good; but their greatest service must always be to increase the stock of good-will among men. One of the worst of chronic human evils is working for daily bread without any interest in the work, and with ill-will towards the institution or person that provides the work. The work of the world must be done; and the great question is, shall it be done happily or unhappily? Much of it is today done unhappily. The new religion will contribute powerfully toward the reduction of this mass of unnecessary misery, and will do so chiefly by promoting good-will among men.

A paganized Hebrew-Christianity has unquestionably made much of personal sacrifice as a religious duty. The new religion will greatly qualify the supposed duty of sacrifice, and will regard all sacrifices as unnecessary and injurious, except those which love dictates and justifies. "Greater *love* hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." Self-sacrifice is not a good or a merit in itself; it must be intelligent and loving to be meritorious, and the object in view must be worth its price. Giving up attractive pleasures or labors in favor of some higher satisfaction, or some engrossing work, is not self-sacrifice. It is a renunciation of inferior or irrelevant objects in favor of one superior object; it is only the intelligent inhibition of whatever distracts from the main pursuit, or the worthiest task. Here, again, the new religion will teach that happiness goes with dutifulness even in this world.

All the religions have been, to a greater or less extent, uplifting and inspiring, in the sense that they raised men's thoughts to some power above them, to some being or beings, which had



more power and more duration than the worshippers had. When kings or emperors were deified, they were idealized, and so lifted men's thoughts out of the daily round of their ordinary lives. As the objects of worship became nobler, purer, and kinder with the progress of civilization, the prevailing religion became more stimulating to magnanimity and righteousness. Will the future religion be as helpful to the spirit of man? Will it touch his imagination as the anthropomorphism of Judaism, polytheism, Islam, and paganized Christianity have done? Can it be as moving to the human soul as the deified powers of nature, the various gods and goddesses that inhabited sky, ocean, mountains, groves, and streams, or the numerous deities revered in the various Christian communions,—God the Father, the Son of God, the Mother of God, the Holy Ghost, and the host of tutelary saints? All these objects of worship have greatly moved the human soul, and have inspired men to thoughts and deeds of beauty, love, and duty. Will the new religion do as much? It is reasonable to expect that it will. The sentiments of awe and reverence, and the love of beauty and goodness, will remain, and will increase in strength and influence. All the natural human affections will remain in full force. The new religion will foster powerfully a virtue which is comparatively new in the world—the love of truth and the passion for seeking it, and the truth will progressively make men free; so that the coming generations will be freer, and therefore more productive and stronger than the preceding. The new religionists will not worship their ancestors; but they will have a stronger sense of the descent of the present from the past than men have ever had before, and each generation will feel more strongly than ever before its indebtedness to the preceding.

The two sentiments which most inspire men to good deeds are love and hope. Religion should give freer and more rational play to these two sentiments than the world has heretofore witnessed; and the love and hope will be thoroughly grounded in and on efficient, serviceable, visible, actual, and concrete deeds and conduct. When a man works out a successful treatment for cerebro-spinal meningitis—a disease before which medicine was absolutely helpless a dozen years ago—by applying to the



discovery of a remedy ideas and processes invented or developed by other men studying other diseases, he does a great work of love, prevents for the future the breaking of innumerable ties of love, and establishes good grounds for hope of many like benefits for human generations to come. The men who do such things in the present world are ministers of the religion of the future. The future religion will prove, has proved, as effective as any of the older ones in inspiring men to love and serve their fellow-beings,—and that is the true object and end of all philosophies and all religions; for that is the way to make men better and happier, alike the servants and the served.

The future religion will have the attribute of universality and of adaptability to the rapidly increasing stores of knowledge and power over nature acquired by the human race. As the religion of a child is inevitably very different from that of an adult, and must grow up with the child, so the religion of a race whose capacities are rapidly enlarging must be capable of a corresponding development. The religion of any single individual ought to grow up with him all the way from infancy to age; and the same is true of the religion of a race. It is bad for any people to stand still in their governmental conceptions and practices, or in the organization of their industries, or in any of their arts or trades, even the oldest; but it is much worse for a people to stand still in their religious conceptions and practices. Now, the new religion affords an indefinite scope, or range, for progress and development. It rejects all the limitations of family, tribal, or national religion. It is not bound to any dogma, creed, book, or institution. It has the whole world for the field of the loving labors of its disciples; and its fundamental precept of serviceableness admits an infinite variety and range in both time and space. It is very simple, and therefore possesses an important element of durability. It is the complicated things that get out of order. Its symbols will not relate to sacrifice or dogma; but it will doubtless have symbols, which will represent its love of liberty, truth, and beauty. It will also have social rites and reverent observances; for it will wish to commemorate the good thoughts and deeds which have come down from former generations. It will have its saints; but its canonizations will be



based on grounds somewhat new. It will have its heroes; but they must have shown a loving, disinterested, or protective courage. It will have its communions, with the Great Spirit, with the spirits of the departed, and with living fellow-men of like minds. Working together will be one of its fundamental ideas,—of men with God, of men with prophets, leaders, and teachers, of men with one another, of men's intelligence with the forces of nature. It will teach only such uses of authority as are necessary to secure the coöperation of several or many people to one end; and the discipline it will advocate will be training in the development of coöperative good-will.

Will such a religion as this make progress in the twentieth-century world? You have heard in this Summer School of Theology much about the conflict between materialism and religious idealism, the revolt against long-accepted dogmas, the frequent occurrence of waves of reform, sweeping through and sometimes over the churches, the effect of modern philosophy, ethical theories, social hopes, and democratic principles on the established churches, and the abandonment of churches altogether by a large proportion of the population in countries mainly Protestant. You know, too, how other social organizations have, in some considerable measure, taken the place of churches. Millions of Americans find in Masonic organizations, lodges of Odd Fellows, benevolent and fraternal societies, granges, and trades-unions, at once their practical religion, and the satisfaction of their social needs. So far as these multifarious organizations carry men and women out of their individual selves, and teach them mutual regard and social and industrial coöperation, they approach the field and functions of the religion of the future. The Spiritualists, Christian Scientists, and mental healers of all sorts manifest a good deal of ability to draw people away from the traditional churches, and to discredit traditional dogmas and formal creeds. Nevertheless, the great mass of the people remain attached to the traditional churches, and are likely to remain so,—partly because of their tender associations with churches in the grave crises of life, and partly because their actual mental condition still permits them to accept the beliefs they have inherited or been taught while young. The new religion



will therefore make but slow progress, so far as outward organization goes. It will, however, progressively modify the creeds and religious practices of all the existing churches, and change their symbolism and their teachings concerning the conduct of life. Since its chief doctrine is the doctrine of a sublime unity of substance, force, and spirit, and its chief precept is, Be serviceable, it will exert a strong uniting influence among men.

Christian unity has always been longed for by devout believers, but has been sought in impossible ways. Authoritative churches have tried to force everybody within their range to hold the same opinions and unite in the same observances, but they have won only temporary and local successes. As freedom has increased in the world, it has become more and more difficult to enforce even outward conformity; and in countries where church and state have been separated, a great diversity of religious opinions and practices has been expressed in different religious organizations, each of which commands the effective devotion of a fraction of the population. Since it is certain that men are steadily gaining more and more freedom in thought, speech, and action, civilized society might as well assume that it will be quite impossible to unite all religiously-minded people through any dogma, creed, ceremony, observance, or ritual. All these are divisive, not uniting, wherever a reasonable freedom exists. The new religion proposes as a basis of unity, first, its doctrine of an immanent and loving God, and secondly, its precept, Be serviceable to fellow-men. Already there are many signs in the free countries of the world that different religious denominations can unite in good work to promote human welfare. The support of hospitals, dispensaries, and asylums by persons connected with all sorts of religious denominations, the union of all denominations in carrying on Associated Charities in large cities, the success of the Young Men's Christian Associations, and the numerous efforts to form federations of kindred churches for practical purposes, all testify to the feasibility of extensive co-operation in good works. Again, the new religion cannot create any caste, ecclesiastical class, or exclusive sect founded on a rite. On these grounds it is not unreasonable to imagine that the new



religion will prove a unifying influence, and a strong reinforcement of democracy.

Whether it will prove as efficient to deter men from doing wrong and to encourage them to do right as the prevailing religions have been, is a question which only experience can answer. In these two respects neither the threats nor the promises of the older religions have been remarkably successful in society at large. The fear of hell has not proved effective to deter men from wrongdoing, and heaven has never yet been described in terms very attractive to the average man or woman. Both are indeed unimaginable. The great geniuses, like Dante and Swedenborg, have produced only fantastic and incredible pictures of either state. The modern man would hardly feel any appreciable loss of motive-power toward good or away from evil if heaven were burnt and hell quenched. The prevailing Christian conceptions of heaven and hell have hardly any more influence with educated people in these days than Olympus and Hades have. The modern mind craves an immediate motive or leading, good for today on this earth. The new religion builds on the actual experience of men and women, and of human society as a whole. The motive powers it relies on have been, and are, at work in innumerable human lives; and its beatific visions and its hopes are better grounded than those of traditional religion, and finer,—because free from all selfishness, and from the imagery of governments, courts, social distinctions, and war.

Finally, this twentieth-century religion is not only to be in harmony with the great secular movements of modern society—democracy, individualism, social idealism, the zeal for education, the spirit of research, the modern tendency to welcome the new, the fresh powers of preventive medicine, and the recent advances in business and industrial ethics—but also in essential agreement with the direct, personal teachings of Jesus, as they are reported in the Gospels. The revelation he gave to mankind thus becomes more wonderful than ever.



*WHAT IS VITAL IN CHRISTIANITY?*<sup>1</sup>

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I do not venture to meet this company as one qualified to preach, nor yet as an authority in matters which are technically theological. My contribution is intended to present some thoughts that have interested me as a student of philosophy. I hope that one or another of these thoughts may aid others in formulating their own opinions, and in defining their own religious interests, whether these interests and opinions are or are not in agreement with mine.

My treatment of the question, What is vital in Christianity? will involve a study of three different special questions, which I propose to discuss in order, as follows:

1. What sort of faith or of practice is it that can be called vital to any religion? That is, By what criteria, in the case of any religion, can that which is vital be distinguished from that which is not vital?

2. In the light of the criteria established by answering this first question, what are to be distinguished as the vital elements of Christianity?

3. What permanent value, and in particular what value for us today, have those ideas and practices and religious attitudes which we should hold to be vital for Christianity?

## I

The term vital, as here used, obviously involves a certain metaphor. That is vital for a living organism without which that organism cannot live. So breathing is a vital affair for us all. That is vital for an organic type which is so characteristic of that

<sup>1</sup>Three addresses given at the Phillips Brooks House, Harvard University, March 18 and 25 and April 1 1909.



type that, were such vital features changed, the type in question, if not altogether destroyed, would be changed into what is essentially another type. Thus the contrast between gill-breathing and lung-breathing appears to be vital for the organic types in question. When we treat the social and mental life which is characteristic of a religion as if it were the life of an organism, or of a type or group of organisms, we use the word vital in accordance with the analogies thus indicated.

If, with such a meaning of the word vital, we turn to the religions that exist among men, we find that any religion presents itself to an observer as a more or less connected group, (1) of religious practices, such as prayers, ceremonies, festivals, rituals, and other observances, and (2) of religious ideas, the ideas taking the form of traditions, legends, and beliefs about the gods or about spirits. On the higher levels, the religious ideas are embodied in sacred books, and some of them are emphasized in formal professions of faith. They also come, upon these higher levels, into a certain union with other factors of spiritual life which we are hereafter to discuss.

Our first question is, naturally, What is the more vital about a religion, its religious practices, or its religious ideas, beliefs, and spiritual attitudes?

As soon as we attempt to answer this question, our procedure is somewhat different, according as we dwell upon the simpler and more primitive, or on the other hand upon the higher and more reflective and differentiated forms or aspects of religion.

In primitive religions, and in the religious lives of many of the more simple-minded and less reflective people of almost any faith, however civilized, the religious practices seem in general to be more important, and more vital for the whole structure of the religious life, than are the conscious beliefs which accompany the practices. I say this is true of primitive religions in general. It is also true for many of the simple-minded followers even of very lofty religions. This rule is well known to the students of the history of religion in our day, and can easily be illustrated from some of the most familiar aspects of religious life. But it is a rule which, as I frankly confess, has frequently been ignored or misunderstood by philosophers, as well as by others who have been



led to approach religions for the sake of studying the opinions of those who hold them. In various religious ideas people may be very far apart, at the same moment when their religious practices are in close harmony. In the world at large, including both the civilized and the uncivilized, we may say that the followers of a cult are, in general, people who accept as binding the practices of that cult. But the followers of the same cult may accompany the acceptance of the cult with decidedly different interpretations of the reason why these practices are required of them, and of the supernatural world which is supposed to be interested in the practices.

In primitive religions this rule is exemplified by facts which many anthropologists have expressed by saying that, on the whole, in the order of evolution, religious practices normally precede at least the more definite religious beliefs. Men come to believe as they do regarding the nature of some supernatural being largely in consequence of the fact that they have first come to follow some course of conduct not for any conscious reason at all but merely from some instinctive tendency which by accident has determined this or that special expression. When the men come to observe this custom of theirs, and to consider why they act thus, some special religious belief often arises as a sort of secondary explanation of their practice. And this belief may vary without essentially altering either the practice or the religion. The pigeons in our college-yard cluster about the benevolent student or visitor who feeds them. This clustering is the result of instinct and of their training in seeking food. The pigeons presumably have no conscious ideas or theories about the true nature of the man who feeds them. Of course, they are somehow aware of his presence, and of what he does, but they surely have only the most rudimentary and indefinite germs of ideas about what he is. But if the pigeons were to come to consciousness somewhat after the fashion of primitive men, very probably they would regard this way of getting food as a sort of religious function and would begin to worship the visitor as a kind of god. If they did so, what idea about this god would be to them vital? Would their beliefs show that they first reasoned abstractly from effect to cause, and said, "He must be a being both powerful and benevolent, for otherwise



his feeding of us in this way could not be explained"? Of course, if the pigeons developed into theologians or philosophers, they might reason thus. But if they came to self-consciousness as primitive men generally do, they would more probably say at first: "Behold, do we not cluster about him and beg from him and coo to him; and do we not get our food by doing thus? He is, then, a being whom it is essentially worth while to treat in this way. He responds to our cooing and our clustering. Thus we compel him to feed us. Therefore he is a worshipful being. And this is what we mean by a god, namely, some one whom it is practically useful to conciliate and compel by such forms of worship as we practice."

If one passes from this feigned instance to the facts of early religious life, one easily observes illustrations of a similar process, both in children and in the more primitive religions of men. A child may be taught to say his prayers. His early ideas of God as a giver of good things, or as a being to be propitiated, are then likely to be secondary to such behavior. The prayers he often says long before he sees why. His elders, at least when they follow the older traditions of religious instruction, begin by requiring of him the practice of saying prayers; and then they gradually initiate the child into the ruling ideas of what the practice means. But for such a stage of religious consciousness the prayer is more vital than the interpretation. In primitive religions taboo and ritual alike precede, at least in many cases, those explanations of the taboos and of the ritual practices which inquirers get in answer to questions about the present beliefs of the people concerned. As religion grows, practices easily pass over from one religion to another, and through every such transition seem to preserve, or even to increase, their sacredness; but they get in the end, in each new religion into which they enter, a new explanation in terms of opinions, themselves producing, so to speak, the new ideas required to fit them to each change of setting. In this process the practices taken over may come to seem vital to the people concerned, as the Mass does to Catholics. But the custom may have preceded the idea. The Christmas and Easter festivals are well-known and classic examples of this process. Christianity did not initiate them. It assimilated them. But it



then explained why it did so by saying that it was celebrating the birth and resurrection of Christ.

It is no part of my task to develop at length a general theory about this frequent primacy of religious practice over the definite formulation of religious belief. The illustrations of the process are, however, numerous. Even on the higher levels of religious development, where the inner life comes to be emphasized, the matter indeed becomes highly complicated, but still, wherever there is an established church, the term "dissenter" often means in popular use a person who will not attend this church, or who will not conform to its practices, much more consciously and decidedly than it means a person whose private ideas about religious topics differ from those of the people with whom he is willing to worship, or whose rules he is willing to obey.

Nevertheless, upon these higher levels a part of the religious requirement very generally comes to be a demand for some sort of orthodoxy. And therefore, upon this level, conformity of practice is indeed no longer enough. However the simple-minded emphasize practice, the religious body itself requires not only the right practice, but also the acceptance of a profession of faith. And on this higher level, and in the opinion of those concerned with the higher aspect of their religion, this acceptance must now be not only a formal act but a sincere one. Here, then, in the life of the higher religions, belief tends to come into a position of primacy which results in a very notable contrast between the higher and the simpler forms and aspects of religious life. When religions take these higher forms, belief is at least officially emphasized as quite equivalent in importance to practice. For those who view matters thus, "He that believeth not shall be damned," an unbeliever is, as such, a foe of the religion in question, and of its gods and of its worshippers. As an infidel he is a miscreant, an enemy not only of the true faith but perhaps of mankind. In consequence, religious persecution and religious wars may come to seem, at least for a time, inevitable means of defending the faith. And those who outgrow, or who never pass through, this stage of warlike propaganda and of persecution may still insist that for them it is faith rather than practice which is the vital element of their religion. To what heights such a view of



the religious life may attain, the Pauline epistles bear witness "Through grace are ye saved." And grace comes by faith, or in the form of faith.

## II

So far, then, we have two great phases or stages of religious life. On the one stage it is religious practice, as such, that is for the people concerned the more vital thing. Their belief is relatively secondary to their practice, and may considerably vary while the practice remains the unvarying, and, for them, vital feature. On the other and no doubt higher, because more self-conscious, stage it is faith that assumes the conscious primacy. And on this second stage, if you believe not rightly, you have no part in the religion in question. That these two stages or phases of the life of religion are in practice closely intermingled, everybody knows. The primitive and the lofty are, in the religious life of civilized men, very near together. The resulting entanglements furnish endlessly numerous problems for the religious life. For in all the higher faiths those who emphasize the inner life make much of faith as a personal disposition. And this emphasis, contending as it does with the more primitive and simple-minded tendency to lay stress upon the primacy of religious practice, has often led to revolt against existing formalism, against ritual requirements, and so to reforms, to heresies, to sects, or to new world-religions. Christianity itself, viewed as a world-religion, was the outgrowth of an emphasis upon a certain faith, to which its new practices were to be, and were, secondary. On the other hand, the appeal that every religion makes to the masses of mankind is most readily interpreted in terms of practice. Thus the baptism of a whole tribe or nation, at the command of their chief, has been sometimes accounted conversion. A formal profession of a creed in such cases has indeed become an essential part of the requirements of the religion in question. But this profession itself can be regarded, and often is regarded by whole masses of the people concerned, as a ceremony to be performed obediently, and no doubt willingly, rather than as an expression of any highly conscious inner conviction. In consequence, an individual worshipper may come to repeat the creed as a more or less magic charm, to ward



off the demons who are known not to like to hear it; or, again, the individual may rise and say the creed simply because the whole congregation at a certain point of the service has to do so.

In particular, since the creeds of the higher faiths relate to what are regarded as mysteries, while the creed must be repeated by all the faithful, the required belief in the creed is often not understood to imply any clear or wise or even intelligent ideas about what the creed really intends to teach. Even in emphasizing belief, then, one may thus interpret it mainly in terms of a willing obedience. The savage converted to the Roman Catholic Church is indeed taught not only to obey, but to profess belief, and as far as possible to get some sort of genuine inner belief. But he is regularly told that for his imperfect stage of insight it is enough if he is fully ready to say, "I believe what the church believes, both as far as I understand what the church believes and also as far as I do not understand what the church believes." And it is in this spirit that he must repeat the creed of the church. But his ideas about God and the world may meanwhile be as crude as his ignorance determines. He is still viewed as a Christian, if he is minded to accept the God of the church of the Christians, even though he still thinks of God as sometimes a visible and "magnified and non-natural" man, a corporeal presence sitting in the heavens, while the scholastic theologian who has converted him thinks of God as wholly incorporeal, as not situated *in loco* at all, as not even existent in time, but only in eternity, and as spiritual substance, whose nature, whose perfection, whose omniscience, and so on, are the topics of most elaborate definition.

Thus, even when faith in a creed becomes an essential part of the requirements of a religion, one often meets, upon a much higher level, that primacy of the practical over the theoretical side of religion which the child's prayers, and the transplanted festivals, and the conceivable religion of the pigeons illustrate. The faithful convert and his scholastic teacher agree much more in religious practices than in conscious religious ideas.

Meanwhile this very situation itself is regarded by all concerned as by no means satisfactory. And those followers of the higher faiths who take the inner life more seriously, are never



content with this acceptance of what seems to them merely external formalism. For them faith, whether it is accompanied with a clear understanding or not, means something essentially interior and deep and soul-transforming. Hence they continually insist that no one can satisfy God who does not rightly view God. And thus the conflict between the primacy of the practical and of the right faith constantly tends to assume new forms in the life of all the higher religions. The conflict concerns the question whether right practice or right belief is the more vital element in religion. Well-known formulae, constantly repeated in religious instruction, profess to solve the problem once for all. But it remains a problem whose solution, if any solution at all is reached, has to be worked out afresh in the religious experience of each individual.

### III

Some of you, to whom one of the best-known solutions of the problem is indeed familiar enough, will no doubt have listened to this statement of the conflict between the primacy of religious practice and the primacy of religious belief with a growing impatience. What right-minded and really pious person does not know, you will say, that there is only one way to overcome this opposition, and that is by remembering that true religion is never an affair either of mere practice, apart from inner sincerity, or of theoretically orthodox opinions, apart from other inner experiences and interests? Who does not know, you will say, that true religion is an affair of the whole man, not of deeds alone, nor of the intellect alone, but of the entire spiritual attitude,—of emotion and of trust,—of devotion and of motive,—of conduct guided by an inner light, and of conviction due to a personal contact with religious truth? Who does not know that about this all the best Christian teachers, whether Catholic or Protestant, are agreed? Who does not know that the Roman Catholic theologian who converts the savage regards his own personal salvation as due, in case he wins it, not to the theoretical accuracy of his theological formulations, but to the direct working of divine grace, which alone can prepare the soul for that vision of God which can never be attained by



mere reasonings, but can be won only through the miraculous gift of insight prepared for the blessed in heaven? Who has not learned that in the opinion of enlightened Christians the divine grace can for this very reason be as truly present in the humble and ignorant soul of the savage convert as in that of his learned and priestly confessor? Who, then, need confound true faith with the power to formulate the mysteries of the faith, except in so far, indeed, as one trustingly accepts whatever one can understand of the teachings of the church? It is indeed, you will insist, grace that saves, and through faith. But the saving faith, you will continue, is, at least in the present life, nothing theoretical. It is itself a gift of God. And it is essentially a spiritual attitude,—at once practical and such as to involve whatever grade of true knowledge is suited to the present stage of the soul in question. Herein, as some of you will say, the most enlightened and the most pious teachers of various religions, and certainly of very various forms of Christianity, are agreed. What is vital in the highest religion is neither the mere practice as external, nor the mere opinion as an internal formulation. It is the union of the two. It is the reaction of the whole spirit in the presence of an experience of the highest realities of human life and of the universe.

If any of you at this point assert this to be the solution of the problem as to what is vital in religion, if you insist that such spiritual gifts as the Pauline charity, and such emotional experiences as those of conversion, and of the ascent of the soul to God in prayer, and such moral sincerity as is the soul of all good works, are regarded by our best teachers as the really vital elements in religion,—you are insisting upon a solution of our problem which indeed belongs to a third, and no doubt to a very lofty phase of the religious consciousness. And it is just this third phase or level of the religious consciousness that I am to try to study in these conferences. But were such a statement in itself enough to show every one of us precisely what this vital feature of the higher religions is, and just how it can be secured by every man, and just how our modern world, with all its doubts and its problems, is related to the solution just proposed, I should indeed have no task in these lectures but to repeat the well-known



formula, to apply it briefly to the case of Christianity, and to leave the rest to your own personal experience.

#### IV

But as a fact, and as most of you know by personal experience, the well-known proposal of a solution thus stated is to most of us rather the formulation of a new problem than the end of the whole matter. If this higher unity of faith and practice, of grace and right-mindedness, of the right conduct and the clear insight, of the knowledge of what is real and the feeling for the deepest values of life,—if all this is indeed the goal of the highest religions, and if it constitutes what their best teachers regard as vital, how far are many of us at the present day from seeing our way towards adapting any such solution to our own cases! For us, the modern world is full of suggestions of doubt regarding the articles of the traditional creeds. The moral problems of our time, full of new perplexities, confuse us with regard to what ought to be done. Our spiritual life is too complex to be any longer easily unified, or to be unified merely in the ways useful for earlier generations. Our individualism is too highly conscious to be easily won over to a mood of absorption in any one universal ideal. Our sciences are too complicated to make it easy for us to conceive the world either as a unity, or as spiritual. The church is, for most of us, no longer one visible institution with a single authoritative constitution, but a variety of social organizations, each with its own traditions and values. The spirit of Christianity, which even at the outset Paul found so hard to formulate and to reduce to unity, can no longer be formulated by us precisely in his terms. Hence some of us seek for some still simpler, because more primitive, type of Christianity. But when we look behind Paul for the genuinely primitive Christianity, we meet with further problems, one or two of which we are soon to formulate more precisely in this discussion. In brief, however vital for a religion may be its power to unify the whole man, outer and inner, practical and intellectual, ignorant and wise, emotional and critical, the situation of our time is such that this unification is no longer so presented to us by any one body of religious teach-



ing, that we can simply accept it from tradition (since in the modern world we must both act and think as individuals for ourselves), nor that we can easily learn it from our own experience, since in these days our experience is no longer as full of the religiously inspiring elements as was the experience of the times of Jonathan Edwards, or of the Reformation, or of the founders of the great mediaeval religious orders, or of the early Christian church. If this unity of the spiritual life is to be reconquered, we must indeed take account of the old solutions, but we must give to them new forms, and adopt new ways, suited to the ideas and to the whole spirit of the modern world. Hence the proposed solution that I just rehearsed is simply the statement of the common programme of all the highest religions of humanity. But how to interpret this programme in terms which will make it of live and permanent meaning for the modern world,—this is precisely the religious problem of today.

To sum up, then, our answer to the first of my three problems, namely, What form of faith or of practice can be called vital to any religion? I reply: In the case of any one of the more primitive religions it is, in general, the religious practices that are the most vital features of that religion, and these practices, in general, are vital in proportion as they are necessary to the social life of the tribe or nation amongst which they flourish, so that, when these vital practices die out, the nation in question either dwindles, or is conquered, or passes over into some new form of social order. Secondly, in the higher religions, because of the emphasis that they lay upon the inner life, and especially in the world-religions such as Buddhism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity, belief tends to become a more and more vital feature of the religions in question, and the beliefs—such as monotheism, or the acceptance of a prophet, or of a longer or shorter formulated creed—are vital to such a religion in ways and to degrees which the preachers and the missionaries, the religious wars and the sectarian conflicts of these faiths illustrate,—vital in proportion as the men concerned are ready to labor or to die for these beliefs, or to impose them upon other men, or to insist that no one shall be admitted to the religious community who does not accept them.

But thirdly, as soon as religious beliefs are thus emphasized as



over against religious practices, the religious practices are not, thereby, in general set aside or even discouraged. On the contrary, they generally grow more numerous, and often more imposing. And consequently, in the minds of the more ignorant, or of the less earnest, of the faithful there appears throughout the life of these higher religions a constant tendency to revert to the more primitive type of religion, or else never, in fact, to rise above that type. Hence, even in the religions wherein conformity is understood to imply a sincere orthodoxy, the primacy of ritual or of other practice over against faith and the inner life constantly tends to hold its own. There arises in such religions the well-known conflict of inner and outer, of faith and merely external works. This conflict remains a constant source of transformations, of heresies, and of reforms, in all these higher religions, and is in fact an irrepressible conflict so long as human nature is what it is. For a great mass of the so-called faithful, it is the conformity of practice that thus remains vital. But the teachers of the religion assert that the faith is vital.

And now, fourthly, the higher religions, especially as represented in their highest type of teachings, are deeply concerned in overcoming and in reducing to unity this conflict of formal observance with genuine faith, wherever the conflict arises. The proposed solution which is most familiar, most promising, if it can be won, and most difficult to be won, is the solution which consists in asserting and of showing, if possible, in life, that what is most vital to religion is not practice apart from faith, nor faith apart from practice, but a complete spiritual reaction of the entire man,—a reaction which, if possible, shall unite a right belief in the unseen world of the faith with the inner perfection and blessedness that ought to result from the indwelling of the truth in the soul, and with that power to do good works and to conform to the external religious requirements which is to be expected from one whose soul is at peace and lives in the light. In a word, what this solution supposes to be most vital to the highest religion is the union of faith and works through a completed spirituality.

Meanwhile, as we have also seen, just our age is especially beset with the problem: How can such a solution be any longer an object of reasonable hope, when the faiths have become uncertain,



the practices largely antiquated, our life and our duty so problematic, and our environment so uninspiring to our religious interests? So much, then, for the first of our three problems.

## V

It is now our task to consider the second of our questions. How does this problem regarding what is vital to a religion appear when we turn to the special case of Christianity?

Our review of the sorts of elements which are found vital upon the various levels of the religious consciousness will have prepared you to look at once for what is most vital about Christianity upon the third and highest of the three levels that I have enumerated. It is true that in the minds of great masses of the less enlightened and less devoted population of the Christian world certain religious practices have always been regarded as constituting the most vital features of their religion. These practices are especially those which for the people in question imply the obedient acceptance of the sacraments of the church. Of course for such, faith is indeed a condition for the efficacy of the sacraments. But faith expresses itself especially through and in one's relation to these sacraments. Such emphasis upon religious practices is inevitable, so long as human nature is what it is. But Christianity is obviously, upon all of its higher levels, essentially a religion of the inner life; and for all those in any body of Christians who are either more devout or more enlightened the problem of the church has always included, along with other things, the problem of finding and formulating the true faith; and such faith is, to such people, vital to their religion. In consequence of its vast successes in conquering, after a fashion, its own regions of the world, Christianity has had to undertake upon a very large scale, and over a long series of centuries, the task of adapting itself to the needs of peoples who were in very various, and often in very primitive, conditions of culture. Hence, in formulating its faith and practice, it has had full experience of the conflict between those who in a relatively childlike and primitive way regard religious practice as the primal evidence and expression of the possession of the true religion, and those who, on the contrary, insist primarily upon right



belief and a rightly guided inner life as a necessary condition for such conduct as can be pleasing to God. Where, as in the case of the Roman Catholic Church, the effort to reconcile these two motives has the longest traditional expression, that is, where the most elaborate official definition of the saving faith has been deliberately joined with the most precise requirements regarding religious practice, the conflict of motives here in question has been only the more notable as a factor in the history of the church,—however completely for an individual believer this very conflict may appear to have been solved. In the Catholic doctrine of the sacraments, in the theory of the conditions upon which their validity depends, and of their effects upon the process of salvation, the most primitive of religious tendencies stand side by side with the loftiest spiritual interests in glaring contrast. On the one hand the doctrine of the sacraments appeals to primitive tendencies, because certain purely magical influences and incantations are in question. The repetition of certain formulae and deeds acts as an irresistible miraculous charm. On the other hand the life of the spirit is furthered through the administration of these same sacraments by some of the deepest and most spiritual of influences, and by some of the most elevated forms of inner life which the consciousness of man has ever conceived. That there is an actual conflict of motives involved in this union of primitive magic with spiritual cultivation, the church in question has repeatedly found, when the greater schisms relating to the validity or to the interpretation of her sacraments have rent the unity of her body, and when, sometimes within her own fold, the mystics have quarrelled with the formalists, and both with the modernists, of any period in which the religious life of the church was at all intense.

Most of you will agree, I suppose, as to the sort of solution of such conflicts between the higher and lower aspects of Christianity which is to be sought, in case there is to be any hope of a solution. You will probably be disposed to say: What is vital in Christianity, if Christianity is permanently to retain its vitality at all in our modern world, must be defined primarily neither in terms of mere religious practice nor yet in terms of merely intellectual formulation, but in terms of that unity of will and intellect that may be expressed in the spiritual disposition of the whole man. You will



say, What is vital in Christianity must be, if anything, the Christian interpretation of human life, and the life lived in the light of this interpretation. Such a life, you will insist, can never be identified by its formal religious practices, however important, or even indispensable, some of you may believe this or that religious practice to be. Nor can one reduce what is vital in Christianity merely to a formulated set of opinions, since, as the well-known word has it, the devils also believe, and tremble, and, as some of you may be disposed benevolently to add, the philosophers also believe, and lecture. No, you will say, the Christian life includes practices, which may need to be visible and formal; it includes beliefs, which may have to be discussed and formulated; but Christianity is, first of all, an interpretation of life,—an interpretation that is nothing if not practical, and also nothing if not guided from within by a deep spiritual interest and a genuine religious experience.

So far we shall find it easy to agree regarding the principles of our inquiry. Yet, as the foregoing review of the historical conflicts of religion has shown us, we thus merely formulate our problem. We stand at the outset of what we want to do.

What is that interpretation of life which is vital to Christianity? How must a Christian undertake to solve his problem of his own personal salvation? How shall he view the problem of the salvation of mankind? What is that spiritual attitude which is essential to the Christian religion? Thus our second problem now formulates itself.

## VI

Amongst the countless efforts to answer these questions there are two which in these discussions we especially need to face. The two answers thus proposed differ decidedly from each other. Each is capable of leading to various further and more special formulations of opinion about the contents of the Christian religion.

The first answer may be stated as follows: What is vital about Christianity is simply the spiritual attitude and the doctrine of Christ, as he himself taught this doctrine and this attitude in the body of his authentic sayings and parables, and as he lived all this out in his own life. All in Christianity that



goes beyond this,—all that came to the consciousness of the church after Christ's own teaching had been uttered and finished, either is simply a paraphrase, an explanation, or an application of the original doctrine of Christ, or else is not vital,—is more or less unessential, mythical, or at the very least external. Grasp the spirit of Christ's own teaching, interpret life as he interpreted it, and live out this interpretation of life as completely as you can, imitating him—and then you are in essence a Christian. Fail to comprehend the spirit of Christ, or to live out his interpretation of life, and you in so far fail to possess what is vital about Christianity. This, I say, is the first of the two answers that we must consider. It is an answer well known to most of you, and an emphasis upon this answer characterizes some of the most important religious movements of our own time.

The second answer is as follows: What is vital about Christianity depends upon regarding the mission and the life of Christ as an organic part of a divine plan for the redemption and salvation of man. While the doctrine of Christ, as his sayings record this doctrine, is indeed an essential part of this mission, one cannot rightly understand, above all one cannot apply, the teachings of Christ, one cannot live out the Christian interpretation of life, unless one first learns to view the person of Christ in its true relation to God, and the work of Christ as an entirely unique revelation and expression of God's will. The work of Christ, however, culminated in his death. Hence, as the historic church has always maintained, it is the cross of Christ that is the symbol of whatever is most vital about Christianity. As for the person of Christ as his life revealed it,—what is vital in Christianity depends upon conceiving this personality in essentially superhuman terms. The prologue to the Fourth Gospel deliberately undertakes to state what for the author of that Gospel is vital in Christianity. This prologue does so by means of the familiar doctrine of the eternal Word that was the beginning, that was with God and was God, and that in Christ was made flesh and dwelt amongst men. Abandon this doctrine and you give up what is vital in Christianity. Moreover, the work of Christ was essential to the whole relation of his own teachings to the life of men. Human nature being what it is, the teaching that



Christ's sayings record cannot enter into the genuine life of any one who has not first been transformed into a new man by means of an essentially superhuman and divine power of grace. It was the work of Christ to open the way whereby this divine grace became and still becomes efficacious. The needed transformation of human nature, the change of life which according to Christ's sayings is necessary as a condition for entering the kingdom of heaven, this is made possible through the effects of the life and death of Christ. This life and death were events whereby man's redemption was made possible, whereby the atonement for sin was accomplished. In brief, what is vital to Christianity includes an acceptance of the two cardinal doctrines of the incarnation and the atonement. For only in case these doctrines are accepted is it possible to interpret life in the essentially Christian way, and to live out this interpretation.

Here are two distinct and, on the whole, opposed answers to the question, What is vital in Christianity? I hope that you will see that each of these answers is an effort to rise above the levels wherein either religious practice or intellectual belief is over-emphasized. It is useless for the partisan of the Christianity of the prologue to the Fourth Gospel to accuse his modern opponent of a willingness to degrade Christ to the level of a mere teacher of morals, and Christianity to a mere practice of good works. It is equally useless for one who insists upon the sufficiency of the gospel of Christ simply as Christ's recorded sayings teach it, to accuse his opponent of an intention to make true religion wholly dependent upon the acceptance of certain metaphysical opinions regarding the superhuman nature of Christ. No, the opposition between these two views regarding what is vital in Christianity is an opposition that appears on the highest levels of the religious consciousness. It is not that one view says, "Christ taught these and these moral doctrines, and the practice of these teachings constitutes all that is vital in Christianity." It is not that the opposing view says: "Christ was the eternal Word made flesh, and a mere belief in this fact and in the doctrine of the atoning death is the vital feature of Christianity." No, both of these two views attempt to be views upon the third level of the religious consciousness,—views about the whole inter-



pretation of the higher life, and of its relation to God and to the salvation of man. So far, neither view, as its leading defenders now hold it, can accuse the other of lapsing into those more primitive views of religion which I have summarized in the earlier part of this paper. And I have dwelt so long upon a preliminary view of the relations between faith and practice in the history of religion, because I wanted to clear the way for a study of our problem on its genuinely highest level, so that we shall henceforth be clear of certain old and uninspiring devices of controversy. Both parties are really trying to express what is vital in the Christian conception of life. Both view Christianity as a faith which gives sense to life, and also as a mode of life which is centred about a faith. The true dispute arises upon the highest levels. The question is simply this: Is the gospel which Christ preached, that is, the teaching recorded in the authentic sayings and parables, intelligible, acceptable, vital, in case you take it by itself? Or, does Christianity lose its vitality in case you cannot give a true sense to those doctrines of the incarnation and the atonement which the traditional Christian world has so long held and so deeply loved? And furthermore, can you, in the light of modern insight, give any longer a reasonable sense to the traditional doctrines of the atonement and the incarnation? In other words: Is Christianity essentially a religion of redemption, in the sense in which tradition defined redemption? Or is Christianity simply that religion of the love of God and the love of man which the sayings and the parables so richly illustrate?

However much, upon its lower levels, Christianity may have used and included the motives of primitive religion, this our present question is not reducible to the terms of the relatively lower conflict between a religion of creed and a religion of practice. The issue now defined concerns the highest interests of religious life.

In favor of the traditional view that the essence of Christianity consists, first, in the doctrine of the superhuman person and the redemptive work of Christ, and, secondly, in the interpretative life that rests upon this doctrine, stands the whole authority, such as it is, of the needs and religious experience of the church of Christian history. The church early found, or at least felt, that



it could not live at all without thus interpreting the person and work of Christ.

Against such an account of what is vital in Christianity stands today for many of us the fact that the doctrine in question seems to be, at least in the main, unknown to the historic Christ, in so far as we can learn what he taught, while both the evidence for the traditional doctrine and the interpretation of it have rested during Christian history upon reports which our whole modern view of the universe disposes many of us to regard as legendary, and upon a theology which many of us can no longer accept as literally true. Whether such objections are finally valid, we must later consider. I mention the objections here because they are familiar, and because in our day they lead many to turn from the tangles of tradition with a thankful joy and relief to the hopeful task of trying to study, to apply, and to live the pure Gospel of Christ as he taught it in that body of sayings which, as many insist, need no legends to make them intelligible, and no metaphysics to make them sacred.

Yet, as a student of philosophy, coming in no partisan spirit, I must insist that this reduction of what is vital in Christianity to the so-called pure Gospel of Christ, as he preached it and as it is recorded in the body of the presumably authentic sayings and parables, is profoundly unsatisfactory. The main argument for doubting that this so-called pure Gospel of Christ contains the whole of what is vital in Christianity rests upon the same considerations that led the historical church to try in its own way to interpret, and hence to supplement, this gospel by reports that may have been indeed full of the legendary, by metaphysical ideas that may indeed have been deeply imperfect, but by a deep instinctive sense of genuine religious values which, after all, was indispensable for later humanity,—a sense of religious values which was a true sense. For one thing, Christ can hardly be supposed to have regarded his most authentically reported religious sayings as containing the whole of his message, or as embodying the whole of his mission. For, if he had so viewed the matter, the Messianic tragedy in which his life-work culminated would have been needless and unintelligible. For the rest, the doctrine that he taught is, as it stands, essentially incomplete. It is not a



rounded whole. It looks beyond itself for a completion, which the master himself unquestionably conceived in terms of the approaching end of the world, and which the church later conceived in terms of what has become indeed vital for Christianity.

As modern men, then, we stand between opposed views. Each view has to meet hostile arguments. Each can make a case in favor of its value as a statement of the essence of Christianity. On the one hand the Christ of the historically authentic sayings,—whose gospel is, after all, not to be understood except as part of a much vaster religious process; on the other hand the Christ of legend, whom it is impossible for us modern men longer to conceive as the former ages of the church often conceived him. Can we choose between the two? Which stands for what is vital in Christianity? And, if we succeed in defining this vital element, what can it mean to us today, and in the light of our modern world?

Thus we have defined our problems. Our next task is to face them as openly, as truthfully, and as carefully as our opportunity permits.

## VII

Let us, then, briefly consider the first of the two views which have been set over against one another.

The teachings of Christ which are preserved to us do indeed form a body of doctrine that one can survey and study without forming any final opinion about the historical character of the narratives with which these teachings are accompanied in the three Synoptic Gospels. The early church preserved the sayings, recorded them, no doubt, in various forms, but learned to regard one or two of the bodies of recorded sayings as especially important and authentic. The documents in which these earliest records were contained are lost to us; but our gospels, especially those of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, preserve the earlier tradition in a way that can be tested by the agreements in the reported sayings as they appear in the different gospels. It is of course true that some of the authentic teachings of Christ concern matters in regard to which other teachers of his own people had already reached insights that tended towards his own. But nobody can doubt that the sayings, taken as a whole, embody a new and



profoundly individual teaching, and are what they pretend to be; namely, at least a partial presentation of an interpretation of life,—an interpretation that was deliberately intended by the teacher to revolutionize the hearts and lives of those to whom the sayings were addressed. Since a recorded doctrine simply taken in itself, and apart from any narrative, is an unquestionable fact, and since a new and individual doctrine is a fact that can be explained only as the work of a person, it is plain that, whatever you think of the narrative portions of the gospels, your estimate of Christ's reported teachings may be freed at once from any of the perplexities that perhaps beset you as to how much you can find out about his life. So much at least he was; namely, the teacher of this doctrine. As to his life, it is indeed important to know that he taught the doctrine as one who fully meant it, that while he taught it he so lived it out as to win the entire confidence of those who were nearest to him, that he was ready to die for it, and for whatever else he believed to be the cause that he served, and that when the time came he did die for his cause. So much of the gospel narrative is with all reasonable certainty to be regarded as historical.

So far, then, one has to regard the teaching of Christ as a perfectly definite object for historical study and personal imitation, and as, in its main outlines, an accessible tradition. It is impossible to be sure of our tradition as regards each individual saying. But the main body of the doctrine stands before us as a connected whole, and it is in its wholeness that we are interested in comprehending its meaning.

Now there is also no doubt, I have said, that this doctrine is intended as at least a part of an interpretation of life. For the explicit purpose of the teacher is to transform the inner life of his hearers, and thus to bring about, through this transformation, a reform of their individual outer life. It is, furthermore, sure that, while the teaching in question includes a moral ideal, it is no merely moral teaching, but is full of a profoundly religious interest. For the transformation of the inner life which is in question has to do with the whole relation of the individual man to God. And there are especially two main theses of the teacher which do indeed explicitly relate to the realm of the superhuman



and divine world, and which therefore do concern what we may call religious metaphysics. That is, these theses are assertions about a reality that does not belong to the physical realm, and that is not confined to the realities which we contemplate when we consider merely ethical truth as such. The first of these religious theses relates to the nature of God. It is usually summarized as the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God. In its fuller statement it involves that account of the divine love for the individual man which is so characteristic and repeated a feature of the authentic sayings. The other thesis is what we now call a judgment of value. It is the assertion of the infinite worth of each individual person,—an assertion richly illustrated in the parables, and used as the basis of the ethical teaching of Christ, since the value that God sets upon your brother is the deepest reason assigned to show why your own life should be one of love towards your brother.

### VIII

So much for the barest suggestion of a teaching which you all know, and which I have not here further to expound. Our present question is simply this: Is this the whole of what is vital to Christianity? Or is there something vital which is not contained in these recorded sayings, so far as they relate to the matters just summarily mentioned?

The answer to this question is suggested by certain very well-known facts. First, these sayings are, in the master's mind, only part of a programme which, as the event showed, related not only to the individual soul and its salvation, but to the reform of the whole existing and visible social order. Or, expressed in our modern terms, the teacher contemplated a social revolution, as well as the before-mentioned universal religious reformation of each individual life. He was led, at least towards the end of his career, to interpret his mission as that of the Messiah of his people. That the coming social revolution was conceived by him in divine and miraculous terms, that it was to be completed by the final judgment of all men, that the coming kingdom was to be not of this world, in the sense in which the Roman Empire was of this world, but was to rest upon the directly visible triumph of God's will through the miraculous appearance of the chosen



messenger who should execute this will,—all this regarding the conception which was in Christ's mind seems clear. But, however the coming revolution was conceived, it was to be a violent and supernatural revolution of the external social order, and it was to appear openly to all men upon earth. The meek, the poor, were to inherit the earth; the mighty were to be cast down; the kingdoms of this world were to pass away; and the divine sovereignty was to take its visible place as the controller of all things.

Now it is no part of my present task to endeavor to state any theory as to why the master viewed his kingdom of heaven, in part at least, in this way. You may interpret the doctrine as the church has for ages done, as a doctrine relating to the far-off future end of all human affairs and to the supernatural mission of Christ as both Saviour and Judge of the world; or you may view the revolutionary purposes of the master as I myself actually do, simply as his personal interpretation of the Messianic traditions of his people and of the social needs of his time and of the then common but mistaken expectation of the near end of the world. In any case, if this doctrine, however brought about or interpreted, was for the master a vital part of his teaching, then you have to view the resulting interpretation of life accordingly. I need not say, however, that whoever today can still find a place for the Messianic hopes and for the doctrine of the last judgment in his own interpretation of Christianity, has once for all made up his mind to regard a doctrine,—and a deeply problematic doctrine,—a profoundly metaphysical doctrine about the person and work of Christ, and about the divine plan for the salvation of man,—as a vital part of his own Christianity.

And now, in this same connection, we can point out that, if the whole doctrine of Christ had indeed consisted for him in regarding the coming of the kingdom of heaven as identical with the inner transformation of each man by the spirit of divine love, then that direct and open opposition to the existing social authorities of his people which led to the Messianic tragedy, would have been for the master simply needless. Christ chose this plan of open and social opposition for reasons of his own. We may interpret these reasons as the historical church has done, or we may view the



matter otherwise, as I myself do. In any case, Christ's view of what was vital in Christianity certainly included, but also just as certainly went beyond, the mere preaching of the kingdom of heaven that is within you.

But one may still say, as many say who want to return to a purely primitive Christianity: Can *we* not choose to regard the religious doctrine of the parables and of the sayings, apart from the Messianic hopes and the anticipated social revolution, as for us vital and sufficient? Can we not decline to attempt to solve the Messianic mystery? Is it not for us enough to know simply that the master did indeed die for his faith, leaving his doctrine concerning the spiritual kingdom, concerning God the Father, and concerning man the beloved brother, as his final legacy to future generations? This legacy was of permanent value. Is it not enough for us?

I reply: To think thus is obviously to view Christ's doctrine as he himself did not view it. He certainly meant the kingdom of heaven to include the inner transformation of each soul by the divine love. But he also certainly conceived even this spiritual transformation in terms of some sort of Messianic mission, which was related to a miraculous coming transformation of human society. In the service of this Messianic social cause he died. And now even in Christ's interpretation of the inner and spiritual life of the individual man there are aspects which you cannot understand unless you view them in the light of the Messianic expectation. I refer to the master's doctrine upon that side of it which emphasizes the passive non-resistance of the individual man, in waiting for God's judgment. This side of Christ's doctrine has been frequently interpreted as requiring an extreme form of self-abnegation. It is this aspect of the doctrine which glorifies poverty as in itself an important aid to piety. In this sense too the master sometimes counsels a certain indifference to ordinary human social relations. In this same spirit his sayings so frequently illustrate the spirit of love by the mention of acts that involve the merely immediate relief of suffering, rather than by dwelling upon those more difficult and often more laborious forms of love which his own life indeed exemplified, and which take the form of the lifelong service of a super-personal social cause.



I would not for a moment wish to over-emphasize the meaning of these negative and ascetic aspects of the sayings. Christ's ethical doctrine was unquestionably as much a positive individualism as it was a doctrine of love. It was also as genuinely a stern doctrine as it was a humane one. Nobody understands it who reduces it to mere self-abnegation, or to non-resistance, or to any form of merely sentimental amiability. Nevertheless, as it was taught, it included sayings and illustrations which have often been interpreted in the sense of pure asceticism, in the sense of simple non-resistance, in the sense of an unworldliness that seems opposed to the establishment and the prizing of definite human ties,—yes, even in the sense of an anarchical contempt for the forms of any present worldly social order. In brief, the doctrine contains a deep and paradoxical opposition between its central assertion of the infinite value of love and of every individual human soul on the one hand, and those of its special teachings on the other hand, which seem to express a negative attitude towards all our natural efforts to assert and to sustain the values of life by means of definite social co-operation, such as we men can by ourselves devise. Now the solution of this paradox seems plain when we remember the abnormal social conditions of those whom Christ was teaching, and interpret his message in the light of his Messianic social mission with its coming miraculous change of all human relations. But in that case an important part of the sayings must be viewed as possessing a meaning which is simply relative to the place, to the people, to the time, and to those Messianic hopes of an early end of the existing social order,—hopes which we know to have been mistakenly cherished by the early church.

I conclude then, so far, that a simple return to a purely primitive Christianity as a body of doctrine complete in itself, directly and fully expressed in the sayings of Christ, and applicable, without notable supplement, to all times, and to our own day,—is an incomplete and therefore inadequate religious ideal. The spiritual kingdom of heaven, the transformation of the inner life which the sayings teach, is indeed a genuine part,—yes, a vital part,—of Christianity. But it is by no means the whole of what is vital to Christianity.



## IX

I turn to the second of the answers to our main question. According to this answer, Christianity is a redemptive religion. What is most vital to Christianity is contained in whatever is essential and permanent about the doctrines of the incarnation and the atonement. Now this is the answer which, as you will by this time see, I myself regard as capable of an interpretation that will turn it into a correct answer to our question. In answering thus, I do not for a moment call in question the just-mentioned fact that the original teaching of the master regarding the kingdom of heaven is indeed a vital part of the whole of Christianity. But I do assert that this so-called purely primitive Christianity is not so vital, is not so central, is not so essential to mature Christianity as are the doctrines of the incarnation and the atonement when these are rightly interpreted. In the light of these doctrines alone can the work of the master be seen in its most genuine significance.

Yet, as has been already pointed out, the literal acceptance of this answer to our question, as many still interpret the answer, seems to be beset by serious difficulties. These difficulties are now easily summarized. The historical Christ of the sayings and the parables, little as we certainly know regarding his life, is still a definite and, in the main, an accessible object of study and of interpretation, just because, whatever else he was, he was the teacher of this recorded interpretation of life,—whether or not you regard that recorded interpretation as a fully complete and rounded whole. But the Christ whom the traditional doctrines of the atonement and of the incarnation present to us appears in the minds of most of us as the Christ of the legends of the early church,—a being whose nature and whose reported supernatural mission seem to be involved in doubtful mysteries—mysteries both theological and historical. Now I am not here to tell you in detail why the modern mind has come to be unwilling to accept, as literal reports of historical facts, certain well-known legends. I am not here to discuss that unwillingness upon its merits. It is enough for my present purpose to say first that the unwillingness exists, and, secondly, that, as a fact, I myself believe



it to be a perfectly reasonable unwillingness. But I say this not at all because I suppose that modern insight has driven out of the reasonable world the reality of spiritual truth. The world of history is indeed a world full of the doubtful. And the whole world of phenomena in which you and I daily move about is a realm of mysteries. Nature and man, as we daily know them, and also daily misunderstand them, are not what they seem to us to be. The world of our usual human experience is but a beggarly fragment of the truth, and, if we take too seriously the bits of wisdom that it enables us to collect by the observation of special facts and of natural laws, it becomes a sort of curtain to hide from us the genuine realm of spiritual realities in the midst of which we all the while live. Moreover, it is one office of all higher religion to supplement these our fragments of experience and ordinary notions of the natural order, by a truer, if still imperfect, interpretation of the spiritual realities that are beyond our present vision. That is, it is the business of religion to lift, however little, the curtain, to inspire us, not by mere dreams of ideal life, but by enlightening glimpses of the genuine truth which, if we were perfect, we should indeed see, not, as now, through a glass darkly, but face to face.

All this I hold to be true. And yet I fully share the modern unwillingness to accept legends as literally true. For it is not by first repeating the tale of mere marvels, of miracles,—by dwelling upon legends, and then by taking the accounts in question as literally true historical reports,—it is not thus that we at present, in our modern life, can best help ourselves to find our way to the higher world. These miraculous reports are best understood when we indeed first dwell upon them lovingly and meditatively, but thereupon learn to view them as symbols, as the products of the deep and endlessly instructive religious imagination,—and thereby learn to interpret the actually definite, and to my mind unquestionably superhuman and eternal, truth that these legends express, but express by figures,—in the form of a parable, an image, a narrative, a tale of some special happening. The tale is not literally true. But its deeper meaning may be absolutely true. In brief, I accept the opinion that it is the office of religion to interpret truths which are in themselves perfectly definite,



eternal, and literal, but to interpret them to us by means of a symbolism which is the product of the constructive imagination of the great ages in which the religions which first voiced these truths grew up. There are some truths which our complicated natures best reach first through instinct and intuition, through parable and legend. Only when we have first reached them in this way, can most of us learn to introduce the practical and indeed saving application of these truths into our lives by living out the spirit of these parables. But then at last we may also hope, in the fulness of our own time, to comprehend these truths by a clearer insight into the nature of that eternal world which is indeed about and above us all, and which is the true source of our common life and light.

I am of course saying all this not as one having authority. I am simply indicating how students of philosophy who are of the type that I follow, are accustomed to view these things. In this spirit I will now ask you to look for a moment at the doctrines of the Incarnation and of the Atonement in some of their deeper aspects. It is a gain thus to view the doctrines, whether or no you accept literally the well-known miraculous tale.

There has always existed in the Christian church a tradition tending to emphasize the conception that the supernatural work of Christ, which the church conceived in the form of the doctrines of the incarnation and the atonement, was not a work accomplished once for all at a certain historical point of time, but remains somehow an abiding work, or, perhaps, that it ought to be viewed as a timeless fact, which never merely happened, but which is such as to determine anew in every age the relation of the faithful to God. Of course, the church has often condemned as heretical one or another form of these opinions. Nevertheless, such opinions have in fact entered into the formation of the official dogmas. An instance is the influence that such an interpretation had upon the historic doctrine of the Mass and of the real presence,—a doctrine which, as I have suggested, combines in one some of the most primitive of religious motives with some of the deepest religious ideas that men have ever possessed. In other less official forms, in forms which frequently approached, or crossed, the boundaries of technical heresy, some of the mediaeval



mystics, fully believing in their own view of their faith, and innocent of any modern doubts about miracles, were accustomed in their tracts and sermons always and directly to interpret every part of the gospel narrative, including the miracles, as the expression of a vast and timeless whole of spiritual facts, whereof the narratives are merely symbols. In the sermons of Meister Eckhart, the great early German mystic, this way of preaching Christian doctrine is a regular part of his appeal to the people. I am myself in my philosophy no mystic, but I often wish that in our own days there were more who preached what is indeed vital in Christianity in somewhat the fashion of Eckhart. Let me venture upon one or two examples.

Eckhart begins as follows a sermon on the text, "Who is he that is born king of the Jews" (Matthew 22): "Mark you," he says, "mark you concerning this birth, where it takes place. I say, as I have often said: This eternal birth takes place in the soul, and takes place there precisely as it takes place in the eternal world,—no more, no less. This birth happens in the essence, in the very foundation, of the soul." "All other creatures," he continues, "are God's footstool. But the soul is his image. This image must be adorned and fulfilled through this birth of God in the soul." The birth, the incarnation, of God occurs then, so Eckhart continues, in every soul, and eternally. But, as he hereupon asks: Is not this then also true of sinners, if this incarnation of God is thus everlasting and universal? Wherein lies then the difference between saint and sinner? What special advantage has the Christian from this doctrine of the incarnation? Eckhart instantly answers: Sin is simply due to the blindness of the soul to the eternal presence of the incarnate God. And that is what is meant by the passage: "The light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness comprehendeth it not."

Or again, Eckhart expounds in a sermon the statement that Christ came "in the fulness of time"; that is, as people usually and literally interpret the matter, Christ came when the human race was historically prepared for his coming. But Eckhart is careless concerning this historical and literal interpretation of the passage in question, although he doubtless also believes it. For him the true meaning of the passage is wholly spiritual. When,



he asks in substance, is the day fulfilled? At the end of the day. When is a task fulfilled? When the task is over. When, therefore, is the fulness of time reached? Whenever a man is in his soul ready to be done with time; that is, when in contemplation he dwells only upon and in the eternal. Then alone, when the soul forgets time, and dwells upon God who is above time, then, and then only, does Christ really come. For Christ's coming means simply our becoming aware of what Eckhart calls the eternal birth; that is, the eternal relation of the real soul to the real God.

It is hard, in our times, to get any sort of hearing for such really deeper interpretations of what is indeed vital in Christianity. A charming, but essentially trivial, religious psychology today invites some of us to view religious experience simply as a chance play-at-hide-and-seek with certain so-called subliminal mental forces and processes, whose crudely capricious crises and catastrophes shall have expressed themselves in that feverish agitation that some take to be the essence of all. Meanwhile there are those who today try to keep religion alive mainly as a more or less medicinal influence, a sort of disinfectant or anodyne, that may perhaps still prove its value to a doubting world by curing dyspepsia, or by removing nervous worries. Over against such modern tendencies,—humane, but still, as interpretations of the true essence of religion, essentially trivial,—there are those who see no hope except in holding fast by a literal acceptance of tradition. There are, finally, those who undertake the task, lofty indeed, but still, as I think, hopeless,—the task of restoring what they call a purely primitive Christianity. Now I am no disciple of Eckhart; but I am sure that whatever is vital in Christianity concerns in fact the relation of the real individual human person to the real God. To the minds of the people whose religious tradition we have inherited this relation first came through the symbolic interpretation that the early church gave to the life of the master. It is this symbolic interpretation which is the historical legacy of the church. It is the genuine and eternal truth that lies behind this symbol which constitutes what is indeed vital to Christianity. I personally regard the supernatural narratives in which the church embodied its faith simply as symbols,



—the product indeed of no man's effort to deceive, but of the religious imagination of the great constructive age of the early church. I also hold that the truth which lies behind these symbols is capable of a perfectly rational statement, that this statement lies in the direction which Eckhart, mistaken as he often was, has indicated to us. The truth in question is independent of the legends. It relates to eternal spiritual facts. I maintain also that those who, in various ages of the church, and in various ways, have tried to define and to insist upon what they have called the "Essential Christ," as distinguished from the historical Christ, have been nearing in various degrees the comprehension of what is vital in Christianity.

## X

What is true must be capable of expression apart from legends. What is eternally true may indeed come to our human knowledge through any event that happens to bring the truth in question to our notice; but, once learned, this truth may be seen to be independent of the historical events, whatever they were, which brought about our own insight. And the truth about the incarnation and the atonement seems to me to be statable in terms which I must next briefly indicate.

First, God, as our philosophy ought to conceive him, is indeed a spirit and a person; but he is not a being who exists in separation from the world, simply as its external creator. He expresses himself in the world; and the world is simply his own life, as he consciously lives it out. To use an inadequate figure, God expresses himself in the world as an artist expresses himself in the poems and the characters, in the music or in the other artistic creations, that arise within the artist's consciousness and that for him and in him consciously embody his will. Or again, God is this entire world, viewed, so to speak, from above and in its wholeness as an infinitely complex life which in an endless series of temporal processes embodies a single divine idea. You can indeed distinguish, and should distinguish, between the world as our common sense, properly but fragmentarily, has to view it, and as our sciences study it,—between this phenomenal world, I



say, and God, who is infinitely more than any finite system of natural facts or of human lives can express. But this distinction between God and world means no separation. Our world is the fragmentary phenomenon that we see. God is the conscious meaning that expresses itself in and through the totality of all phenomena. The world, taken as a mass of happenings in time, of events, of natural processes, of single lives, is nowhere, and at no time, any complete expression of the divine will. But the entire world, of which our known world is a fragment,—the totality of what is, past, present, and future, the totality of what is physical and of what is mental, of what is temporal and of what is enduring,—this entire world is present at once to the eternal divine consciousness as a single whole, and this whole is what the absolute chooses as his own expression, and is what he is conscious of choosing as his own life. In this entire world God sees himself lived out. This world, when taken in its wholeness, is at once the object of the divine knowledge and the deed wherein is embodied the divine will. Like the Logos of the Fourth Gospel, this entire world is not only with God, but is God.

As you see, I state this doctrine, for the moment, quite summarily and dogmatically. Only an extensive and elaborate philosophical discussion could show you why I hold this doctrine to be true. Most of you, however, have heard of some such doctrine as the theory of the Divine Immanence. Some of you are aware that such an interpretation of the nature of God constitutes what is called philosophical Idealism. I am not here defending, nor even expounding, this doctrine. I believe, however, that this is the view of the divine nature which the church has always more or less intuitively felt to be true, and has tried to express, despite the fact that my own formulation of this doctrine includes some features which in the course of the past history of dogma have been upon occasion formally condemned as heresy by various church-authorities. But for my part I had rather be a heretic, and appreciate the vital meaning of what the church has always tried to teach, than accept this or that traditional formulation, but be unable to grasp its religiously significant spirit.

Dogmatically, then, I state what, indeed, if there were time, I ought to expound and to defend on purely rational grounds.



God and his world are one. And this unity is not a dead natural fact. It is the unity of a conscious life, in which, in the course of infinite time, a divine plan, an endlessly complex and yet perfectly definite spiritual idea, gets expressed in the lives of countless finite beings and yet with the unity of a single universal life.

Whoever hears this doctrine stated, asks, however, at once a question,—the deepest, and also the most tragic question of our present poor human existence: Why, then, if the world is the divine life embodied, is there so much evil in it,—so much darkness, ignorance, misery, disappointment, warfare, hatred, disease, death?—in brief, why is the world as we know it full of the unreasonable? Are all these gloomy facts but illusions, bad dreams of our finite existence,—facts unknown to the very God who is, and who knows, all truth? No,—that cannot be the answer; for then the question would recur: Why are these our endlessly tragic illusions permitted? Why are we allowed by the world-plan to be so unreasonable as to dream these bad dreams which fill our finite life, and which in a way constitute this finite life? And that question would then be precisely equivalent to the former question, and just as hard to solve. In brief, the problem of evil is the great problem that stands between our ordinary finite view and experience of life on the one hand and our consciousness of the reasonableness and the unity of the divine life on the other hand.

Has this problem of evil any solution? I believe that it has a solution, and that this solution has long since been in substance grasped and figured forth in symbolic forms by the higher religious consciousness of our race. This solution, not abstractly stated, but intuitively grasped, has also expressed itself in the lives of the wisest and best of the moral heroes of all races and nations of men. The value of suffering, the good that is at the heart of evil, lies in the spiritual triumphs that the endurance and the overcoming of evil can bring to those who learn the hard, the deep but glorious, lesson of life. And of all the spiritual triumphs that the presence of evil makes possible, the noblest, is that which is won when a man is ready, not merely to bear the ills of fortune tranquilly if they come, as the Stoic moralists required their followers to do, but when one is willing to suffer



vicariously, freely, devotedly, ills that he might have avoided, but that the cause to which he is loyal, and the errors and sins that he himself did not commit, call upon him to suffer in order that the world may be brought nearer to its destined union with the divine. In brief, as the mystics themselves often have said, sorrow,—wisely encountered and freely borne,—is one of the most precious privileges of the spiritual life. There is a certain lofty peace in triumphing over sorrow, which brings us to a consciousness of whatever is divine in life, in a way that mere joy, untroubled and unwon, can never make known to us. Perfect through suffering,—that is the universal, the absolutely necessary law of the higher spiritual life. It is a law that holds for God and for man, for those amongst men who have already become enlightened through learning the true lessons of their own sorrows, and for those who full of hope still look forward to a life from which they in the main anticipate joy and worldly success, and who have yet to learn that the highest good of life is to come to them through whatever willing endurance of hardness they, as good soldiers of their chosen loyal service, shall learn to choose or to endure as their offering to their sacred cause. This doctrine that I now state to you is indeed no ascetic doctrine. It does not for a moment imply that joy is a sin, or an evil symptom. What it does assert is that as long as the joys and successes which you seek are expected and sought by you simply as good fortune, which you try to win through mere cleverness—through mere technical skill in the arts of controlling fortune,—so long, I say, as this is your view of life, you know neither God's purpose nor the truth about man's destiny. Our always poor and defective skill in controlling fortune is indeed a valuable part of our reasonableness, since it is the natural basis upon which a higher spiritual life may be built. Hence the word, "Young men, be strong," and the common-sense injunction, "Be skilful, be practical," are good counsel. And so health, and physical prowess, and inner cheerfulness, are indeed wisely viewed as natural foundations for a higher life. But the higher life itself begins only when your health and your strength and your skill and your good cheer appear to you merely as talents, few or many, which you propose to devote, to surrender, to the divine order, to what-



ever ideal cause most inspires your loyalty, and gives sense and divine dignity to your life,—talents, I say, that you intend to return to your master with usury. And the work of the higher life consists, not in winning good fortune, but in transmuting all the transient values of fortune into eternal values. This you best do when you learn by experience how your worst fortune may be glorified, through wise resolve, and through the grace that comes from your conscious union with the divine, into something far better than any good fortune could give to you; namely, into a knowledge of how God himself endures evil, and triumphs over it, and lifts it out of itself, and wins it over to the service of good.

The true and highest values of the spiritual world consist, I say, in the triumph over suffering, over sorrow, and over unreasonableness, and the triumph over these things may appear in our human lives in three forms: First, as mere personal fortitude,—as the stoical virtues in their simplest expression. The stoical virtues are the most elementary stage of the higher spiritual life. Fortitude is indeed required of every conscious agent who has control over himself at all. And fortitude, even in this simplest form as manly and strenuous endurance, teaches you eternal values that you can never learn unless you first meet with positive ills of fortune, and then force yourself to bear them in the loyal service of your cause. Willing endurance of suffering and grief is the price that you have to pay for conscious fidelity to any cause that is vast enough to be worthy of the loyalty of a lifetime. And thus no moral agent can be made perfect except through suffering borne in the service of his cause. Secondly, the triumph over suffering appears in the higher form of that conscious union with the divine plan which occurs when you learn that love, and loyalty, and the idealizing of life, and the most precious and sacred of all human relationships, are raised to their highest levels, are glorified, only when we not merely learn in our own personal case to suffer, to sorrow, to endure, and be spiritually strong, but when we learn to do these things together with our own brethren. For the comradeship of those who willingly not merely practise fortitude as a private virtue but as brethren in sorrow is a deeper, a sweeter, a more blessed



comradeship than ever is that of the lovers who have not yet been tried so as by fire. Then the deepest trials of life come to you and your friend together, and when, after the poor human heart has indeed endured what for the time it is able to bear of anguish, it finds its little moment of rest, and when you are able once more to clasp the dear hand that would help if it could, and to look afresh into your friend's eyes and to see there the light of love as you could never see it before,—then, even in the darkness of this world, you catch some faint far-off glimpse of how the spirit may yet triumph despite all, and of why sorrow may reveal to us, as we sorrow and endure together, what we should never have known of life, and of love, and of each other, and of the high places of the spirit, if this cup had been permitted to pass from us. But thirdly, and best, the triumph of the spirit over suffering is revealed to us not merely when we endure, when we learn through sorrow to prize our brethren more, and when we learn to see new powers in them and even in our poor selves, powers such as only sorrow could bring to light,—but when we also turn back from such experiences to real life again, remembering that sorrow's greatest lesson is the duty of offering ourselves more than ever to the practical service of some divine cause in this world. When one is stung to the heart and seemingly wholly overcome by the wounds of fortune, it sometimes chances that he learns after a while to arise from his agony, with the word: "Well then, if, whether by my own fault or without it, I must descend into hell, I will remember that in this place of sorrow there are the other souls in torment, seeking light; I will help them to awake and arise. As I enter I will open the gates of hell that they may go forth." Whatever happens to me, I say, this is a possible result of sorrow. I have known those men and women who could learn such a lesson from sorrow and who could practise it. These are the ones who, coming up through great tribulation, show us the highest glimpse that we have in this life of the triumph of the spirit over sorrow. But these are the ones who are willing to suffer vicariously, to give their lives as a ransom for many. These tell us what atonement means.

Well, these are, after all, but glimpses of truth. But they show us why the same law holds for all the highest spiritual



life. They show us that God too must sorrow in order that he may triumph.

Now the true doctrine of the Incarnation and of the Atonement is, in its essence, simply the conception of God's nature which this solution of the problem of evil requires. First, God expresses himself in this world of finitude, incarnates himself in this realm of human imperfection, but does so in order that through finitude and imperfection, and sorrow and temporal loss, he may win in the eternal world (that is, precisely, in the conscious unity of his whole life) his spiritual triumph over evil. In this triumph consists his highest good, and ours. It is God's true and eternal triumph that speaks to us through the well-known word: "In this world ye shall have tribulation. But fear not; I have overcome the world." Mark, I do not say that we, just as we naturally are, are already the true and complete incarnation of God. No, it is in overcoming evil, in rising above our natural unreasonableness, in looking towards the divine unity, that we seek what Eckhart so well expressed when he said, Let God be born in the soul. Hence the doctrine of the incarnation is no doctrine of the natural divinity of man. It is the doctrine which teaches that the world-will desires our unity with the universal purpose, that God will be born in us and through our consent, that the whole meaning of our life is that it shall transmute transient and temporal values into eternal meanings. Humanity becomes conscious God incarnate only in so far as humanity looks godwards; that is, in the direction of the whole unity of the rational spiritual life.

And now, secondly, the true doctrine of the atonement seems to me simply this: We, as we temporally and transiently are, are destined to win our union with the divine only through learning to triumph over our own evil, over the griefs of fortune, over the unreasonableness and the sin that now beset us. This conquest we never accomplish alone. As the mother that bore you suffered, so the world suffers for you and through and in you until you win your peace in union with the divine will. Upon such suffering you actually depend for your natural existence, for the toleration which your imperfect self constantly demands from the world, for the help that your helplessness so often needs. When you sorrow, then, remember that God sorrows,—sorrows in you, since in all



your finitude you still are part of his life; sorrows for you, since it is the intent of the divine spirit, in the plan of its reasonable world, that you should not remain what you now are; and sorrows, too, in waiting for your higher fulfilment, since indeed the whole universe needs your spiritual triumph for the sake of its completion.

On the other hand, this doctrine of the atonement means that there is never any completed spiritual triumph over sorrow which is not accompanied with the willingness to suffer vicariously; that is, with the will not merely to endure bravely, but to force one's very sorrow to be an aid to the common cause of all mankind, to give one's life as a ransom for one's cause, to use one's bitterest and most crushing grief as a means towards the raising of all life to the divine level. It is not enough to endure. Your duty is to make your grief a source of blessing. Thus only can sorrow bring you into conscious touch with the universal life.

Now all this teaching is old. The church began to learn its own version of this solution of the problem of evil when first it sorrowed over its lost master; when first it began to say: "It was needful that Christ should suffer"; when first in vision and in legend it began to conceive its glorified Lord. When later it said, "In the God-man Christ God suffered, once for all and in the flesh, to save us; in him alone the Word became flesh and dwelt among us," the forms of its religious imagination were transient, but the truth of which these forms were the symbol was everlasting. And we sum up this truth in two theses: First, God wins perfection through expressing himself in a finite life and triumphing over and through its very finitude. And secondly, Our sorrow is God's sorrow. God means to express himself by winning us through the very triumph over evil to unity with the perfect life, and therefore our fulfilment, like our existence, is due to the sorrow and the triumph of God himself. These two theses express, I believe, what is vital in Christianity.



*MODERN METHODS IN NEW TESTAMENT PHILOLOGY*

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The language of the Greek New Testament has been under the continual search-light of criticism since the early part of the seventeenth century, when the keen debate between the Purist and the Hebraist produced a copious literature. The former laid a very heavy burden on his own shoulders. Although he could easily argue for his thesis of the "purity" of the New Testament language by citing numberless parallels between it and the best Greek writers, it was hard to account for the many points of divergence, and consequently the Hebraist steadily gained ground. Antecedent probability, as well as common sense, seemed to be on the side of the latter. For the New Testament was akin to the Septuagint, and that was regarded as a treasure-house of Semitisms. Moreover most of the writers of the New Testament were Jews, and nothing seemed more natural than that their Greek should be deeply tinged with the idioms of their native tongue. Accordingly Hebraism was granted large concessions, and under it were included not only the Greek expressions which happened to have sister-constructions in Hebrew or Aramaic, but also many usages peculiar to Greek but unusual in the days of the best Attic. These Semitisms were supposed so to affect syntax, vocabulary, and style as to make the result un-greek.

The victory of the Hebraists led finally to another view which for long hindered New Testament philology. Enthusiasts regarded the New Testament language as in every sense sacred, too sublime to submit to rules, governed by laws of its own caprice. They were so impressed with the treasures conveyed to them that they came to deem the conveying vessel divine. In other words, they canonized the language as well as the subject-matter. In 1860 Rothe used the oft-quoted words: "It is indeed proper to speak of a 'language of the Holy Spirit'; for the Bible offers



ocular demonstration of the way in which the divine Spirit has fashioned a unique religious dialect out of the languages of each of those communities that formed the scene of His revealing activity,"—words which were repeated by Cremer in the ninth edition of his *Biblisch-theologisches Wörterbuch* (1902).

On the other side the classical scholar too often flouted the language of the New Testament as a mere jargon, unworthy of attention beside the studied art of classicism. For him it was a stone of stumbling, it contravened all rules by which he wrote his own artificial prose, and it offered an amusing field for pedantic correction. At a glance he could see that New Testament Greek is decidedly "unclassical." His eyes were fixed upon the stately style of Thucydides, the rounded phrases of Attic oratory, the majesty of Athenian drama, or the prose poetry of Plato, and he failed to see the different, but no less striking, merits of the New Testament writers.

The modern era in New Testament philology began about the end of the first quarter of the last century when G. B. Winer published (1822) the first edition of his New Testament Greek Grammar. The ancient Sanskrit literature had been brought to the knowledge of European scholars in the closing decades of the eighteenth century, and in the beginning of the nineteenth the new science of comparative philology had been founded. This put an end to much of the superficial empiricism of earlier methods, and gave a new impetus to linguistic study. Philology was no longer an incomplete and mechanical process of compilation of examples and exceptions. Thorough scientific and comparative sifting was necessary before proper deductions could be drawn and rules laid down; and language had now to be viewed as a living organism evolving itself according to psychological and physical conditions. No arbitrary external standards might be imposed upon it, its laws could be inferred only from an investigation of its internal constitution.

It was Winer's merit to realize to some extent what this new science meant for New Testament Greek, and he was able to give a wider outlook, and to inaugurate a period of immense activity in the philological study of the New Testament. Many editions and translations of his grammar appeared during his



lifetime and after his death; and the awakened interest was promptly directed to lexicographical work, and to the study of synonyms and the making of concordances. But New Testament Greek still retained its isolation, neither emancipated from the shackles of Hebraism nor elevated above the scorn of the classicist. It was still customary to speak of New Testament, or Biblical, or Christian, Greek as something specifically independent, uncorrelated with the contemporary secular language of its time. The dogma of verbal inspiration was so understood as to chill scientific appreciation. Christianity was supposed to have made for herself a select language as well as a peculiar people.

But the nineteenth century accumulated a great store of new materials for study in this field. Since the day when August Böckh launched his huge *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* (1828) a vast wealth of inscriptions has been brought to us from all parts of the once far-extending Greek world. Even more significant have been the surprising finds of thousands of unlitrary and litrary papyri preserved to us by the dry climate and sand of Egypt. From the rubbish heaps of the same country, and of its southern neighbor, large numbers of inscribed potsherds, or "ostraca," have found their way into our hands. With the use of this material the present generation has seen the beginning of still a third period of New Testament philology, in which have come profoundly important changes in method and point of view.

Until the present generation even epigraphy scarcely affected New Testament study, Böckh's great collection of inscriptions being mainly ignored by students of the New Testament. It is now demonstrated that the New Testament vocabulary did not stand isolated, but was one with the vernacular of its day, the so-called Koinê, or "common dialect" of the Hellenistic-Roman world in which it had its origin. In it the influence of many contemporary political and religious conceptions not connected with the Old Testament can be clearly recognized. To Adolf Deissmann<sup>1</sup> belongs the credit of inaugurating this new era and of

<sup>1</sup> Bibelstudien, Beiträge zumeist aus den Papyri und Inschriften zur Geschichte der Sprache, des Schrifttums und der Religion des hellenistischen Juden



opening a great future for the further prosecution of New Testament philology by showing the lexical connection of the New Testament with the inscriptions, the papyri, and the writers of the Koinê.

The next requisite was a more exact knowledge of the contemporary Koinê, and the philologist Albert Thumb has now depicted for us the origin and nature of this type of Greek and its true place in the history of the Greek language. He confirmed Deissmann's position and went further, by bringing to bear both on the Koinê and on New Testament Greek a wide knowledge of modern popular Greek, by the aid of which, among other things, he strengthened the case against Hebraisms.

With these scholars should be named James Hope Moulton, *patris laborum heres*, now professor of Hellenistic Greek in Victoria University, Manchester. He supplemented Deissmann's discoveries from collections of inscriptions and papyri previously unused, and has now in the field of New Testament grammar demonstrated<sup>2</sup> that the accidence and syntax of the New Testament are substantially those of the vernacular Koinê. His work is the more valuable because, following Thumb's example, he has availed himself of the evidence to be drawn from modern Greek.

That the progress of philology has thus broken down the wall of partition for the language of the New Testament and removed its erstwhile isolation is a great service to the right understanding of the book's contents. The result has been not to impoverish but to enrich the meaning of many words, as we come to see their origin and significance in the contemporary pagan world. Thus we now know that such words and expressions as *σωτήρ*, *κύριος*, *υἱὸς θεοῦ*, *εὐαγγέλιον*, *κυριακὴ ἡμέρα* and many others, are not of Christian coinage, but are taken from the religious language of the surrounding heathen or Jewish world. As Christianity came

tums und des Urchristentums, 1895; -Neue Bibelstudien, Sprachgeschichtliche Beiträge zumeist aus den Papyri und Inschriften zur Erklärung des Neuen Testaments, 1897 (English translation in one volume, Bible Studies, 1901, <sup>2</sup>1903); New Light on the New Testament, 1907; The Philology of the Greek Bible, 1908; Licht vom Osten; das Neue Testament und die neuentdeckten Texte der hellenistisch-römischen Welt, 1908.

<sup>2</sup> A Grammar of New Testament Greek, vol. i, Prolegomena, 1906, <sup>2</sup>1906, <sup>3</sup>1908.



at first to "the poor ones," "the meek," and "the little ones" of this world, she did not disdain their language, but sought to make herself intelligible in the every-day speech of the common man. Her language is the natural, unaffected language of the heart, quite at one with that of the lower and middle classes and always intelligible to them. Its place is with the spoken rather than with the written Koinê. The authors of the New Testament, taken as a whole, had no thought of fame or of distant ages, but wrote for the need of the time in which they lived, the while their thoughts were occupied with the supposedly near approach of the Parousia. The New Testament has become literature, has produced literature, and has dominated literature in spite of the fact that it was not primarily intended for literature. The classical period of Attic Greek was one of beauty in outward things and of form, one in which art was cherished for its own sake; the classical excellence of New Testament Greek lies in its simplicity and direct forcefulness, the beauty is of the matter. The great literary achievement of the New Testament is the fact that it has made literature out of common colloquial speech and reared an eternal monument of the language of the lower strata of society.

The principal uncial MSS. in which our New Testament text has been preserved were written between 300 and 500 A.D., in a time of atticizing tendency. We should therefore expect that a popular or plebeian character of the autographs would not always be strictly preserved. They were in fact "corrected," not modernized but archaized, or atticized, in details. Wellhausen<sup>3</sup> maintains that Codex Bezae often preserves the more plebeian character of the original text. Even in the days of the autographs this tendency was in some degree present; we find Matthew, and to a still greater extent the more elegant Luke, correcting or removing plebeianisms of Mark. The tendency toward greater elegance in language naturally increased when Christianity conquered her former oppressors and made herself recognized as the established religion of the Roman Empire. Luke, as just said, set the example in the preparation of his works for "his Excellency, Theophilus," and when Christianity gained her place of

<sup>3</sup> Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien, 1905. p. 13.



power at the courts of potentates and began to reside in palaces (both royal and episcopal), she began to pay more attention to outward form and to array herself in court-dress.<sup>4</sup>

No one maintains that Christianity was able to pour all her new concepts into the old lexical vessels. It is not to be denied that distinctively Christian words sprang up, but these are much less numerous than was supposed a few years ago. Kennedy<sup>5</sup> calculated that about 550 out of the 5000 words in the New Testament were "Biblical," that is about twelve per cent. On the other hand Deissmann reckons<sup>6</sup> that not more than fifty new formations, or one per cent, are to be found, for "primitive Christianity was a revolution of the inmost life of man, but not a revolution of the Greek lexicon." Christianity did little in her early days to increase the number of words to be registered in a Greek lexicon; her work was to enrich and deepen their meaning. Later on, in the ecclesiastical period of dogma and apologetics, the word-minting capacity of the church was considerably increased.

Upon Semitisms, including both Hebraisms and Aramaisms, the flood-gates of advancing New Testament philology have been opened wide, and this once stately edifice has now fallen to ruins. On the same principle on which the Semitists collected their array of Semitisms, we might now take almost any civilized language, English, German, or French, and by comparing it with the Greek of the New Testament find enough coincidences to justify, if priority in time permitted, a claim of Anglicisms, Teutonisms, or Gallicisms. The search for Semitisms has been carried to high degrees of absurdity. Even at the present day it is still well represented in the grammatical works of the Abbé Viteau,<sup>7</sup> who describes *un énorme mélange d'hébraïsmes*. Viteau, however, is

<sup>4</sup> Cf. E. Schwyzer, *Die Weltsprachen des Altertums in ihrer geschichtlichen Stellung*, 1902, p. 32.

<sup>5</sup> *Sources of New Testament Greek*, 1895, pp. 60-83, and p. 93.

<sup>6</sup> *Expositor*, Jan. 1908, pp. 70, 71. Cf. also *Licht vom Osten*, p. 47, "In der religiös schöpferischen Urzeit ist die wortbildende Kraft des Christentums bei weitem nicht so gross, als seine begriffsumbildende Wirkung."

<sup>7</sup> *Étude sur le Grec du Nouveau Testament; Le verbe, syntaxe des propositions*, 1893; *Sujet, complément et attribut*, 1896.



reasonable as compared with A. Schlatter,<sup>8</sup> who has laboriously compared the language of the Fourth Gospel word for word and sentence for sentence with the Hebrew of a Rabbinical commentary on Exodus, and finds Hebraisms in such natural and colorless expressions as  $\sigma\upsilon\ \tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}$ ; and  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ . Neither Deissmann nor Moulton would deny that Semitic influence is to be found in the language of the Septuagint<sup>9</sup> and New Testament, but they hold that it was exerted chiefly in the realm of style and of ideas. The Septuagint is naturally more "Hebraic," being "translation Greek." Its thoughts were first cast in old Hebrew forms and later recast in those of the Hellenistic language, and of necessity it has retained the marks of its oriental origin.

In the New Testament we must differentiate those parts which are free Greek from those which were composed or translated from Aramaic originals. Some of the New Testament writers were more Jews than Hellenists;<sup>10</sup> their minds worked in Aramaic, and it would be impossible that such men should write as good idiomatic Greek as a native Hellenist. They did not use many wholly un-greek expressions, but, as Moulton phrases it, over-worked possible, but unidiomatic, Hellenistic expressions when they happened to correspond with Semitic usage. "A Semitism which definitely contravenes Greek syntax" is rare. It is wrong to ascribe to Semitic influences every breach in concord and every reminder of the fact that the New Testament was not primarily written for the schools. A residuum of real Semitisms, though small, cannot be denied, especially in view of the work of Dalman<sup>11</sup> and Wellhausen.<sup>12</sup> There is no occasion in the ardor of recent

<sup>8</sup> *Die Sprache und Heimat des vierten Evangelisten*, 1902; see Thumb's withering criticism in *Archiv für Papyrusforschung*, 1906, p. 461.

<sup>9</sup> Jean Psichari in a learned "Essai sur le Grec de la Septante," in the *Revue des études juives*, April, 1908, points out by way of protest against Deissmann and Moulton certain Hebraisms to be detected by the use of modern popular Greek.

<sup>10</sup> A notable exception is Paul, who, though a Hebrew of Hebrews, spoke Greek like a second mother-tongue, and thought in Greek. See, however, Zahn, *Einleitung in das Neue Testament*, 3d ed., i, p. 33; cf. the literature noted by Milligan, *Commentary on Thessalonians*, p. lv, and Jülicher, "Hellenism," in *Encyclopaedia Biblica*.

<sup>11</sup> *Die Worte Jesu*, 1898, English translation, 1902.

<sup>12</sup> *Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien*, 1905, pp. 1-43.



conversion for us to carry the reaction too far. Nevertheless, a safe attitude will be that recommended by an unknown anti-semitic letter-writer of August 4, A.D. 41,<sup>13</sup> καὶ σὺ βλέπε σατὸν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἰουδαίων.

Closely allied to Semitisms, and even more completely laid than they, is the ghost of a Jewish or Judæo-Christian Greek, the existence of which as a special and separate idiom of the Koinê is maintained by Zahn<sup>14</sup> and Viteau and, under the name of *hellenistisches Idiom*, by Winer-Schmiedel.<sup>15</sup> The idea is built largely on hypothesis, and the corresponding facts are wanting. As between the home-keeping Palestinian Jews and the Jews of the Diaspora the former were, it is true, the more conservative in language, as in customs and religion. Palestine in the first century was certainly bi-lingual, and the existence of two languages side by side no doubt caused interaction, which would be felt especially by the weaker language. Aramaic was spoken by our Lord, as by Palestinian Jews in general when at home or in company with their fellow-countrymen. But although Palestine was not so thoroughly hellenized as Syria, Egypt, or Asia Minor, the language of Hellenism surrounded Aramaic on all sides. It was the language of culture, and occupied an eminent position as the language of the Roman government, so that the people must in some measure have become acquainted with it. It was also the language of commerce, and wherever any commercial advantage is to be gained by the knowledge of another tongue the Jew has never allowed it to be lost. But because a Palestinian Jew may have spoken this foreign tongue unidiomatically, that does not prove that there was a current Jewish-Greek dialect. Of any peculiar Jewish pronunciation of Greek we have no trace,<sup>16</sup> although we do know of a Syrian pronunciation.

<sup>13</sup> Aegyptische Urkunden aus den kgl. Museen zu Berlin: Griechische Urkunden, vol. iv, 1907, no. 1079; quoted also in Licht vom Osten, p. 82, footnote 6.

<sup>14</sup> "Die griechische Sprache unter den Juden," Einleitung in das Neue Testament<sup>3</sup>, i, pp. 24-52.

<sup>15</sup> G. B. Winer's Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Sprachidioms, 8th ed., 1894, p. 25.

<sup>16</sup> Thumb, op. cit., p. 177.



Outside Palestine there is still less reason to speak of a specific Jewish Greek. The Jew, whenever he left the home-land, became hellenized. No doubt the average new-comers from Palestine did not speak with the facility of those who had been longer and in more immediate contact with Greek. But among the cosmopolitan Jews Greek gained ground and Aramaic was gradually forgotten, so that in the third century B.C. a Greek translation of the Scriptures was called for in Egypt. In fact, wherever outside of Palestine the Jew settled, even the language of his religion and of the synagogue, in which we should expect to find most conservatism, became Greek. In Jerusalem itself there were Greek synagogues where the Hellenistic Jews and proselytes worshipped. Of great interest is the broken lintel-inscription found at Corinth /ΤΩΓΗΕΒΡ/, which is to be completed as ΣΥΝΑΓΩΓΗ ΕΒΡΑΙΩΝ, and may well have belonged to the Jewish synagogue in which Paul preached (Acts 18 4).<sup>17</sup>

The extant unliterary Koinê is not the only evidence against Semitisms and Jewish Greek. It is just possible that the ubiquitous Jew or roving Semite, when he found himself with his compatriots in distant parts of Egypt or Asia Minor, or in the cities of Greece, there spoke and wrote his Greek with a few not quite obliterated Semitic peculiarities disagreeable to his neighbors. But when we find the evidence of inscriptions, papyri, and ostraca borne out by the popular Greek of the present day, when we find these quondam Semitisms leading their own natural life in the colloquial language of the villages of modern Greece, we have a conclusive argument against the theory that magnifies coincidences into Semitisms.

The protagonist of the use of modern Greek to support this argument is Thumb. He points out, for example, that ὄνομα in the signification of "person" (found in the papyri) is exactly the modern Greek νομάτοι.<sup>18</sup> He parallels the *hébraïsme pur* of Viteau, καὶ ὁ οἶκος οὗτος ὁ ὑψηλός, πᾶς ὁ διαπορευόμενος αὐτὸν ἐκστῆσεται (LXX, 2 Chron. 7 21) from a fifteenth-century poem, where no one will suspect Hebraism: ἡ πόλις ἡ ἀγάπη σου, ἐπῆραν

<sup>17</sup> Now in the Museum of Corinth. See *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, xviii, 1898, p. 333; *American Journal of Archaeology*, 1903, pp. 60-61.

<sup>18</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 123.



τὴν οἱ τοῦρκοι.<sup>19</sup> Similarly Psichari has made large use of modern Greek, as has Moulton in his *Prolegomena*.

The New Testament language in its phonetics, morphology, syntax, and vocabulary, is thus seen to be a living plastic language, with a life of its own quite independent of Hebrew or Aramaic. One finds practically all the same phenomena in contemporary Greek.

Besides the books already named other works in New Testament philology must be more briefly mentioned. Thus the writings of W. M. Ramsay of Aberdeen have shown in a very practical way how the New Testament text may be studied, both historically and philologically, in the light of ancient Greek inscriptions.

A great service has been rendered by the New Testament concordances of Bruder (1842, '1888) and of Moulton and Geden (1897), the former of which is to appear in a new edition revised by Schmiedel. Bruder's has the practical advantage for students that it gives the full Greek text of the references in the case of all the prepositions and even for the particles *καί* and *δέ*. It has the disadvantage of being mainly based on the Textus Receptus, although the last edition takes account of the principal deviations of Tregelles and of Westcott and Hort. The concordance of Moulton and Geden omits *καί* and *δέ* altogether, and for some words gives lists of mere references without the Greek text; prepositions, for instance, which always govern the same case are "treated compendiously." It has the advantage that it gives "the text of the Greek Testament as set forth in the latest and best critical editions," Westcott and Hort's text being taken as a standard with which are compared the texts of the eighth edition of Tischendorf and of the English Revisers.

In the field of grammar Winer has formed the groundwork

<sup>19</sup> Op. cit., p. 131, cf. p. 127, "Bevor jemand von der biblischen Gräcität behauptet, 'l'hébreu a donc exercé une influence profonde sur l'emploi des voix et sur leur signification,' sollte er sich die mittel- und neugriechische Grammatik genau ansehen; denn es geht schlechterdings nicht mehr ohne deren Studium, wenn man die Sprache der griechischen Bibel beurteilen will." A careful study of Hatzidakis, *Einleitung in die neugriechische Grammatik*, 1892, Thumb, *Handbuch der neugriechischen Volkssprache*, 1895, and Dieterich, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der griechischen Sprache von der hellenistischen Zeit bis zum X. Jahrhundert nach Christo*, 1898, will shake the faith of any believer in Semitisms.



for most New Testament grammars since published. In its English translations by J. H. Thayer (1869) and W. F. Moulton (1870) it has presided over the exegesis of nearly half a century in England and America. In 1859 appeared the not-yet-forgotten grammar of Alexander Buttmann (English translation by Thayer, 1873), which carried on the traditions of Winer. A better known work is the grammar of F. Blass,<sup>20</sup> the first edition of which appeared while Blass still labored under the shackles of the old theories, so that he writes of New Testament Greek that it is "a special idiom, following its own laws," and among the phenomena of the language finds many Semitisms. In the second edition his point of view had slightly changed; he took a more cautious position on the burning question of Semitisms, and called in modern Greek to his service, acknowledging that New Testament Greek shows "an intermediate stage on the road from ancient to modern Greek."

Two years earlier than Blass, in 1894, began to appear the eighth edition of Winer, revised and enlarged by P. W. Schmiedel,<sup>21</sup> and it is still in progress. This is a work of decided merit, in which the reviser bravely endeavored to bring to bear modern philological science. Unfortunately for his work, he began a little too early for the use of the new papyri. Deissmann remarks that there is "too much Winer and too little Schmiedel."

Burton's work, *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek* (1888, '1900), has remained the best authority in its department to the present day. The appearance of a translation into Dutch (1906) with additions by de Zwaan bears testimony to its merits.

The two volumes of the *Étude sur le Grec du Nouveau Testament* by Viteau are top-heavy and destined to fall under the weight of the *énorme mélange d'hébraïsmes*. Viteau is enslaved entirely to the old school, he sees in the Greek of the New Testament (and Septuagint) almost as many Hebraisms as Schlatter.

<sup>20</sup> *Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch*, 1896, 2 1902, English translation, 1898, second edition, revised and enlarged, 1905.

<sup>21</sup> I. Theil, *Einleitung und Formenlehre*, 1894; II. Theil, *Syntax*, 1. Heft, 1897, 2. Heft, 1898. Schmiedel's attention having been diverted to other subjects, E. Schwyzer will assist in the completion of this long-delayed publication.



Moreover analogy will account for a great many of the sins of his "Judaean-Christian" Greek. In his works, however, we have a useful collection of material and many suggestive remarks.

Finally we come to the *magnum opus* of recent New Testament grammatical work, the *Prolegomena* of Professor James Hope Moulton, a book of great timeliness, which has been heartily welcomed by scholars. Moulton's grammar is based firmly on the new foundations, and is beyond doubt the most independent New Testament grammar that has appeared since Winer's first edition. His first volume, which prefaces the systematic grammar with "a general sketch of Hellenistic language and the position of the New Testament writers in its development," is mainly devoted to a singularly successful attempt at "a readable account of the history and characteristics of Common Greek, bringing in . . . the newly available evidence which might assist the New Testament scholar," and leaves the conviction behind "that the New Testament from the linguistic point of view stands in the most vital connection with the Hellenistic world surrounding it." All who are interested in New Testament study must eagerly await the appearance of a second volume from the same careful pen.

Another New Testament grammar has been for some time in preparation by L. Radermacher, known from his contributions to classical journals, and is to appear as the opening part of the first volume of Lietzmann's *Handbuch zum Neuen Testament*.<sup>22</sup>

In the department of New Testament Lexicography no such high point of excellence has yet been attained as in that of grammar. Over the existing lexicons it may fairly be said that *hic jacet* has already been written. Grimm's revision of Wilke's *Clavis Novi Testamenti philologica* (1862-68, '1903) did good service in its day. It was translated, improved, and granted a longer life in the two editions of J. H. Thayer's *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament* (1886), which remains to this day admittedly the best lexicon available. H. Cremer's

<sup>22</sup> In his preface to *A Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament*, New York, 1908, A. T. Robertson announces that he has already written a number of chapters of a "larger grammar of the Greek New Testament on the scale of Winer," which he will finish as rapidly as possible.



*Biblisch-theologisches Wörterbuch der neutestamentlichen Gräcität* (1866, <sup>9</sup>1902) is a laborious collection of valuable material, but was unscientific from the beginning.

From Dutch scholars come two lexicons which, though not directly or solely devoted to the New Testament, can be used with advantage. Especially commendable is van Herwerden's *Lexicon Graecum suppletorium et dialecticum*, with the *Appendix* to the same.<sup>23</sup> These volumes give us a useful collection of material, considerably extending our knowledge of Hellenistic Greek; no New Testament student can afford to neglect them.<sup>24</sup> The *Grieksch-theologisch woordenboek hoofdzakelijk van de oud-christelijke letterkunde* of J. M. S. Baljon (1895-99) covers not only the New Testament but also the Septuagint and the early Christian literature. It is said to be virtually a translation of Cremer, and to be deficient in philological accuracy and over-attentive to belated and useless etymologies.

A new Lexicon for the New Testament and early Christian literature by E. Preuschen has for some time been in progress, and three parts have appeared.<sup>25</sup> One purpose of Preuschen's work is to render a concordance practically unnecessary, but since we already possess reliable concordances, this is a doubtful merit. References are given for the usages of New Testament words in the apocryphal writings, while references from profane literature and from the later ecclesiastical writers are lacking. A decided demerit is the silence as to papyri and inscriptions. It promises but little advance on existing New Testament lexicons.

Here should be mentioned the "Lexical Notes from the Papyri" by J. H. Moulton and G. Milligan, begun in the *Expositor* for January, 1908, and various monographs and articles by Nägeli, Wendland, Thieme, Nachmanson, and Heitmüller. The scope of this paper does not permit notice of other important works

<sup>23</sup> Leyden, 1902; Appendix, 1904; "Nova addenda," in *Mélanges Nicole*, Geneva, 1905.

<sup>24</sup> Deissmann, "Die Sprache der griechischen Bibel," in *Theologische Rundschau*, 1906, p. 223.

<sup>25</sup> Vollständiges griechisch-deutsches Handwörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments und der übrigen urchristlichen Literatur, 1908-.



on the Koinê and on modern Greek from Dieterich, Hatzidakis, Thumb, Mayser, Krumbacher, Kretschmer, Psichari, and others.

On Deissmann's instructive article on "New Testament Philology" in the *Expositor* for January, 1908, one may venture two criticisms. First, Deissmann has not sufficiently emphasized the suggestiveness of E. A. Abbott's *Johannine Grammar* (1906).<sup>26</sup> This is little wonder; Abbott's grammar was antiquated the moment it came from the press, for his investigation has been pursued altogether from the old classical standpoint, and with too little attention to Hellenistic Greek. But he has been a pioneer in the careful study of the language of individual writers of the New Testament. Deissmann admits the "great need of critical studies of the style of the separate books of the New Testament," and Moulton observes that the varieties of culture in the different books are "sufficiently marked to make it imperative on us to take each author by himself, assigning him his place on the 'grammatometer' which we may construct by the aid of the papyri."<sup>27</sup> Here is abundant scope for students of Hellenistic Greek equipped with Abbott's careful and patient scholarship; we stand as much in need of a Pauline or Lukan grammar as of a Johannine.<sup>28</sup> Such works would be of more than ephemeral value and would doubtless help to settle many troublesome questions in Pauline and Lukan criticism.

Secondly, while Deissmann has shown how the New Testament must be studied in the light of the inscriptions, papyri, and ostraca, he has made no mention of the aid to be had for forms, syntax, and meaning of words from modern popular Greek, the direct lineal descendant of the Koinê. Theoretically the advantage for the New Testament of the study of modern Greek was

<sup>26</sup> See the reviews by J. H. Moulton in *American Journal of Theology*, Jan. 1907, pp. 157-164, and by T. Nicklin in *Classical Review*, xx, p. 172.

<sup>27</sup> *The Science of Language and the Study of the New Testament*, Manchester, 1906, p. 20.

<sup>28</sup> But cf. Winer-Schmiedel, p. 3, "Eine Specialgrammatik einzelner nt. Autoren erscheint unnötig. Das Individuelle der Diction des Johannes, des Paulus etc. bewegt sich fast nur in dem Gebiete der Wörter und Phrasen (Lieblingsausdrücke) oder fällt dem rhetorischen Element anheim. Die Grammatik wird nur selten davon berührt, häufiger nur bei der Apokalypse."



known and admitted many years ago, as for instance by W. F. Moulton in his translation of Winer. It is a pity that the following words of Geldart, written in 1870, did not produce more effect: "The Greek of the present day affords a better commentary on the language of Polybius, of the Septuagint, and of the New Testament than either the writings of contemporary historians, rhetoricians, grammarians, or philosophers, who, for the most part, wrote a purely artificial Greek."<sup>29</sup> With this agree the words of J. H. Moulton: "We find in the Greek of today . . . and the folk-songs of modern Hellas, or the Gospels as translated into the vulgar tongue by Pallis, an aid to the Greek Testament study which no grammarian can afford to ignore." Psichari goes so far as to say that to estimate the Septuagint at its proper value as a philological document, one ought to translate it entirely into the most popular modern Greek.

In the interpretation of the New Testament the first slight attempt at a practical application of modern Greek has been made by A. Pallis in his *A Few Notes on the Gospels according to St. Mark and St. Matthew*,<sup>30</sup> in which, for example, he explains the ἡμέρα ἑκκαίρος of Mark 6 21 as meaning "an empty day," "a day without work," not "a convenient day."

But New Testament students now stand in need of a complete new set of modern scientific commentaries. The authors of such commentaries must write with the monuments of colloquial contemporary Greek before them and with a considerable knowledge of modern Greek. The light from the recently discovered sources will show, for example, that the Friend of sinners and of the poor knew the circumstances of their daily life even to the market-value of sparrows, when he said, "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing?" (Mt. 10 29), or "Are not five sparrows sold for two farthings?" (Lk. 12 6).<sup>31</sup> Modern discoveries will teach us the better to appreciate the New Testament by showing us that it is the book of humanity and for humanity just because

<sup>29</sup> The Modern Greek Language, Oxford, 1870, p. 102.

<sup>30</sup> Liverpool, 1903; see Thumb, "Die Forschungen über die hellenistische Sprache in den Jahren 1902-4," in Archiv für Papyrusforschung, 1906, p. 460.

<sup>31</sup> See Deissmann, Licht vom Osten, p. 196.



it has not despised the common language of every day.<sup>32</sup> It has helped to preserve from destruction the popular language of its own day, a language parallel to that popular Greek language of the present which scholars like Psichari, Pallis, and others are trying to reduce to written record.

Very worthy beginnings of such commentaries have already been made for some of the books of the New Testament. First should be mentioned the admirable work of George Milligan on the epistles to the Thessalonians (1908). In the same line but not all of equal merit are Lietzmann's Romans and First and Second Corinthians, Klostermann and Gressmann's Mark,<sup>33</sup> W. C. Allen's Matthew (1907), J. Armitage Robinson's Ephesians (1903, <sup>2</sup>1904), and Zahn's commentary on John (1908).

All the problems of the grammar of the New Testament and the Koinê are not yet settled, and will not be even when Moulton and Radermacher and Robertson have completed their grammars. Moulton's *Prolegomena* gives many hints of detailed investigations that are urgently needed.

The New Testament manuscripts call for fresh consideration in the light of what we now know of the Koinê. Thus we have fresh criteria to apply in order to determine provenance. Such apparently trivial phenomena as the wavering use of vowels, itacism, aspiration, psilosis, the conduct of *v*-movable, the interchange of the three orders of mutes, must be carefully estimated by the textual critic. The investigation of the great uncial manuscripts in the light of the established dialectic differences in the Koinê, especially those of pronunciation, has an important bearing on the determination of the place and even the time of their writing, and so contributes to the pressing problem of localizing the great types of text.<sup>34</sup> A scribe would be prone to betray the

<sup>32</sup> While the New Testament is predominantly colloquial language, we ought not to go so far as Deissmann in maintaining that it is *in toto* colloquial, but must recognize in authors like Paul and Luke varying degrees of literary language, though a literary language in sympathy with the vernacular.

<sup>33</sup> These four in Lietzmann's *Handbuch zum Neuen Testament*, 1906-1909.

<sup>34</sup> Conversely our uncial MSS. may assist in studying dialectic differences in the Koinê.



provincialisms of his own locality.<sup>35</sup> Our materials, however, need to be handled with caution; a given criterion may point equally to two widely different regions, for instance both to Egypt and to Asia Minor. Again a scribe of a certain environment and training, copying a manuscript of alien type, would consciously or unconsciously remove apparently trivial characteristics in his exemplar—a process which would blur the differences between local types.

The greatest need of the present day is a New Testament lexicon, but it is a herculean task. To its author *honos propter onus*. Many monographs and separate pieces of work have already appeared which will serve the purpose of such a lexicon. Among these may be mentioned Moulton and Milligan's "Lexical Notes from the Papyri," referred to above, the works of Nägeli, Mayser, Helbing, Völker, Anz, etc. The author of such a lexicon must take into account all the usages and peculiarities of the words and expressions as reflected in all available inscriptions, papyri, and ostraca, and in all extant authors of the Hellenistic period from Alexander the Great until 500 or 600 A.D., emphasizing especially the colloquial language to which for the most part the New Testament belongs. The scope of a New Testament lexicon has been often outlined by Deissmann,<sup>36</sup> and in his latest book he has defined the three chief requisites as (1) "the bringing of the New Testament vocabulary into living linguistic contact with the surrounding world," (2) "careful ascertainment of the successive phases of change in meanings," (3) "a fresh apprehension in their simplicity and vitality of the ideas of popular early Christianity,—that body of ideas which a pedantic scholastic prejudice has isolated and so has made to seem complicated, artificial, and lifeless." It is gratifying to know that the scholar who has conceived so lofty an idea of the scope of the task is himself engaged in the preparation of a New Testament lexicon.

But the task of New Testament philology is not done when we

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Thumb, *Die griechische Sprache im Zeitalter des Hellenismus*, p. 179; and "Die sprachgeschichtliche Stellung des biblischen Griechisch," in *Theologische Rundschau*, 1902, p. 97.

<sup>36</sup> *Licht vom Osten*, pp. 300–301; also *Expositor*, 1908, p. 72; *New Light on the New Testament*, p. 111.



have found the relation of our texts to the popular speech of their day and also studied them with the aid of modern Greek. We must not overlook the importance of the Byzantine literature, the study of which has in this generation received an impetus from the work of such philologists as Krumbacher, Thumb, and Dieterich, and from the establishment of the Leipzig *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* in 1892.<sup>37</sup>

In comparison with the remains of the earlier Hellenistic period and with modern Greek, the Byzantine literature, written in the "mummified Byzantine language," as Hatzidakis calls it, can rank only second in importance. It is not so natural, direct, trustworthy; we find in it too much affectation, learned censorship, and archaism. One can easily recognize this in the papyri of this later period, from which we get but little help in forms and still less in syntax. Yet the Byzantine literature is valuable lexically, as well as from the numerous direct statements made by its scholars and grammarians. What they scorn as unworthy of the language of a past golden age is to us often of special interest.

It thus appears that the New Testament language has now been rescued from its long scholastic isolation, due to theological prejudice and classical contempt, and restored to its rightful place as the greatest and most interesting monument of the Koinê. It must therefore be studied in the light of the Greek which preceded it, that of its own day, that of the Byzantine period, and modern Greek.

Further, any one familiar with the Synoptic Gospels will readily perceive that at every step the New Testament student must call in a first-hand knowledge of Palestinian Aramaic in order to make any progress towards a solution of the synoptic problem. The promise of such a method can be seen in Wellhausen's *Einleitung*. Greater results could have been attained if Wellhausen had combined with his wide knowledge of Aramaic as wide a knowledge of Hellenistic Greek. This is a field, however, which all cannot enter, as all cannot be at the same time specialists in

<sup>37</sup> For a brief survey of the literature of this period see K. Krumbacher, "Die griechische Literatur des Mittelalters" in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, I, 8, p. 287 ff., and a detailed account in his *Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur von Justinian bis zum Ende des oströmischen Reiches*, 21897.



Hellenistic and in Aramaic. It is a work which the philologist must do, the theologian as ever reaping the harvest whether thirty or a hundredfold.

The New Testament, written in "the queenliest tongue ever spoken on this earth," and clothed in the linguistic dress of its own day, claims its due and large place in the history of that language; it is of all books in the Greek tongue the one on which least effort after art and outward grace has been spent, and yet is the greatest book of that wonderful language, and to its interpretation must be brought all the past results, and many not yet gathered, of the study of Greek philology.



*SOME ASPECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY  
OF RUDOLPH EUCKEN*

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The debt of religion to philosophy is thus far a somewhat questionable obligation. The influence of philosophy upon religion has been, of course, profound; but this influence has been by no means always helpful or beneficent. Indeed there is some reason to say that, take the world together, philosophy has quite as often hindered the development of the religious consciousness as it has set forward the course of religious progress.

From time to time the great and wondrous truths of experience, out of which religion has its spring, have been rediscovered by adventurous souls, always to the great joy of a goodly portion of mankind. Never has such rediscovery failed to produce a deep impression on the living generation of men. Even the mere rumor of it will bring to pass something like the results which follow when a new gold-field is located. The same kind of "stampede" is apt to take place to secure a portion of this new spiritual treasure. But no sooner does a vigorous religious movement come into being than men begin to philosophize about it. They must needs elaborate and systematize the truths to which it has witnessed; they feel it incumbent upon them to explain its origin and to map out its path to future greatness. This is inevitable, since man is an intellectual being, and knows in his heart that if he can arrive at an adequate understanding of the facts of experience, he can use this knowledge to enlarge the sources of his well-being. But in many instances it has been none the less lamentable; for the spring of spiritual life, upon which humanity again and again stumbles in its desert wanderings, is quite as frequently trampled out of sight in the battle of creeds that sets in above it. So many and so different are the speculations concerning it which



speedily arise, and so zealous does each school of thought become in the advocacy of its peculiar views, that presently there is no longer any water of life to quench men's thirst, but only certain theories as to the nature and properties of that water believed to have been once found.

Something even worse than this may come to pass; for, entertaining only a benevolent design to preserve and purify the spring, philosophy may yet poison it, so that it becomes a source of infection rather than of refreshment and strength. Religion has always been, by turns, the world's greatest blessing and its heaviest curse. Vice generally half recognizes, at least, its own deformity, and is seldom so threatening to man's higher life as is that contaminated stream of religious tradition and belief of which men partake under the delusion that it is supremely medicinal to their souls.

This poison which gets to be so thoroughly mingled with religious ideas and customs, comes mainly from a false philosophy. Human reason, on the whole, is still unable to cope adequately with the big problems of existence, though by narrowing its field of observation to a few of the most convenient and manageable facts it easily convinces itself that it has solved them all; and its overconfident answers to the riddles that confront us have often been fraught with very unhappy consequences to the religious life, which it has thus led seriously astray.

Nevertheless one is permitted to hope and believe that it remains for philosophy to render to religion, in the end, an inestimable service: to show men a path wherein they can walk with certain steps toward spiritual riches which hitherto they have found, too often, only by instinct or by accident. The spiritual nature of mankind holds, it may be, what are as yet undreamed-of possibilities. Certainly wonderful experiences are recorded, on testimony which it is difficult to impeach. But not often do those who have reached the high places of the spirit know very clearly by what road they arrived; and hence they are not able to point out a plain path for others to follow.

But if, at last, by means of insight and study and reflection, reason can show us the road to what a few of the greatest souls have found, and show it so convincingly that "wayfaring men,



though fools, shall not err therein," the world's religion will thereby inherit an immeasurable benefit.

It is the purpose of this paper to point out the indications of some clear gain which recent philosophy has made in this direction. That Professor Eucken has given us a final and complete exposition of the religious life it would be far too much to claim. But his is one of the broadest and sanest interpretations of existence, from the religious point of view, as yet afforded us; and we will try at a few points to set forth its promise of helpfulness to the religious life.

The standpoint which we shall occupy in this endeavor is that of the religious mind, looking out to see what probable gain and assistance is being brought to it by a friendly power. We will not assume to take the philosophic point of view; but, holding our outlook and position as religious men, it is surely legitimate for us to form some estimate of forces which appear to be marching to our relief.

The first superior feature of Eucken's philosophy to which I desire to call attention, is the balance of emphasis maintained in his thought between the three supreme realities with which religion has to deal, that is to say, God and nature and the human soul. Plant-life is nourished mainly on three elements; and though the formula by which these elements are supplied needs to be varied for different kinds of vegetation, there must be enough of all three, or plant-life languishes. The most conspicuous failure of the farmer is his neglect to furnish his growing crops with one at least of these three requisites.

So the religious life, wherever it finds natural and strong expression, always lays something like equal emphasis on three great and separate types of being: God and nature and man; and wherever religious life fails either to maintain itself or to produce good fruit, it is perhaps chiefly because one of these has been too much neglected.

That this is true ought to be fairly evident in the very statement of what religion always has been. It might be defined as man's endeavor to secure help from spiritual sources in his contest with a somewhat unfriendly world. At least that is what religion is wherever it amounts to anything as a power in human



affairs. It recognizes in nature a power so far unfriendly as to be sometimes a source of temptation and oppression. It recognizes God as at least a possible ally of the soul in its struggle for freedom and security. It recognizes the human soul as a reality great enough to be the recipient of divine favor, and as a thing separable and distinct from the background of nature against which it matches its strength.

It must be plain, then, that if any one of these three terms drops much out of notice, religion has no longer any excuse for being. Without nature, there is no sufficient reason for seeking God's help. Without God, there is no source whence help can come. Without the soul as something apart from nature, there is nothing to be helped.

There are, of course, conspicuous instances which illustrate the spiritual poverty that results when religious life shuts its eyes to one of these supreme realities. Thus Buddhism was in its origin practically an atheistic faith. Its founder taught men to expect no help whatever from the gods, but to rely solely on the power of self-denial residing in their own wills. Human nature, it is true, revenged itself upon this Eastern prince, and upon his system, by making him its deity. But it remains a faith without any real doctrine of God; and never has it built up, in the minds of the men over whom it has held sway, any robust spiritual life.

The great failure of Christianity through the larger portion of its history has come from its lack of a decent doctrine of man. Those human souls which were initiated, by the magic rites of the Church, into a fellowship of saints, have been regarded as of some consequence in the scheme of things; but for man, as man, most Christians have manifested, and do still manifest, the utmost contempt. The ruling schools of Christian philosophy, for many centuries, used the whole of existence to make it redound to the glory of God, at the expense of humanity. It became a kind of sin to think of the creature as possessing or deserving any glory whatever in the presence of his creator. The thought of man was reduced almost to its meanest and its lowest terms. The very ardor of religious passion was no doubt responsible, in large measure, for this result; for the soul which has caught a vision of Deity often displays something of that tendency to immolate



itself which draws the moth toward the flame. But for purposes of life it should be evident enough that religion can be no great help to the world without deep love and respect for what is in man.

In our own day we have seen a religious movement manifesting astonishing powers of growth,—springing up indeed with suspicious rapidity like a fungus over night,—while studiously ignoring the third of these fundamental terms. To the Christian Scientist nature is a negligible quantity. The whole of the material world is treated as a realm of shadows. This is the latest of a long line of experiments to found the spiritual life on a denial of the reality of that outward world which appears to be the soul's antagonist. Its significance for us lies mainly in the fact that it is of our day, and illustrates the constant tendency of religious thought, down to this present time, to ease its task by throwing aside one of the three elements which it is asked to weave together.

The real problem of religious philosophy is to make a system of thought in which God and man and nature stand together: none of these being merged and lost in another's larger presence. Endless examples might be given of attempts to solve this problem by evasion, and of the weakness in religion that inevitably results. Thus the great weakness of modern liberalism has been a disposition to exalt nature at the expense of man; to slight and belittle the deep facts of human consciousness in comparison with the laws that regulate the world of physical things. By yielding to this tendency the intellect can be placated, through the partial elimination of some of those mysteries in whose presence it stands baffled and uneasy; but it means the sure impoverishment of spiritual life.

Now in the thought of Eucken there appears to be intelligent appreciation of the necessity for keeping all these supreme realities before the mind's attention, and a sustained endeavor to frame a system of ideas in which no one of them shall suffer eclipse. That means much for religion, if the world should listen to and be impressed by what he has to say; because such a philosophy accords with the real genius of religion, and affords a reasonable basis for full and complete manifestation of the religious life.

More specifically, in its relation to other recent systems of



thought, Eucken's philosophy stands for a return to personality as a fact of cosmic significance. Traditional Christian theology has never rightly considered what it means that man is a person. The scientific mind of our time has largely taken it for granted that personality is an illusion; that what each one calls himself is no real entity, but a mere succession of states of consciousness. Spiritual and religious movements like New England Transcendentalism, being more or less under the influence of this great new wave of scientific interest, have rather tended to abandon the thought of personality. "The soul," said Mr. Emerson, "knows no persons." Even Dr. Hedge had doubts whether human personality were anything great enough, or important enough, to survive the shock of death. In Professor Eucken we have one able to do full justice to all that modern science has to say; one, moreover, who fully understands and appreciates the whole history of philosophic thought; and who puts man, as a person, in that place of something like equality with God and nature, to which unreflective religion instinctively assigns him.

Eucken seems to have examined with minute and patient care the rival schemes of "naturalism" and "intellectualism," to use his terms; the former of which will only allow that man's inward world is the evanescent shadow of the real outward world; while the other school is positive that man knows external nature only as a reflection of his own inner world of thought. Both of these philosophic schemes he finds defective: though for naturalism, especially, he entertains deep respect, as for a foeman worthy of his steel. His own attempt appears to be to utilize what is best in the thought of both naturalist and idealist to form a new personalistic philosophy that will answer better as an interpretation of the whole of existence. He thus supplies to the current thought of the age that missing third term which is needed to put it once more in touch with the main line of religious development. Plenty of thought in this our day concerns itself with God and with nature, as with realities of the highest rank. Not so much of it dares assume that man's existence as a spiritual being is of the same high order.

It is quite beyond the scope of our present purpose to enter into the question of personality, as between Eucken and the



reigning naturalistic school. What I am here endeavoring to point out is that when any of these fundamental facts of the religious life are overlooked, religion must suffer swift decline: that in effect the thought of man has fallen to a much lower place than that occupied by the thought of God and the thought of nature; and that Eucken's philosophy affords at least some promise of its restoration, to the consequent strengthening of those motives which underlie religious effort.

The second feature of this great German's thought which seems to me worthy of comment, as seen from the point of view we have chosen to take, is his conception of the relationship that exists between God and man and nature. As a matter of course the divine power is conceived of as being friendly, and only friendly, to human life. God as he exists for his children upon earth is, above all else, redeeming love. The old Hebraic idea of an avenging Deity, who averts his face from those with whom he is offended, means nothing to this philosopher. His views of the moral character of God are as enlightened as any one could ask.

What relation exists between God and nature, save that he is the maker and builder of nature's forms, it is perhaps no special business of ours to try to discover; but it is highly important that we should understand what relation exists between ourselves and nature. And this, in all that pertains to our higher life, Eucken conceives to be largely antagonistic.

With regard to this point I should like to say again that such a conviction seems to me vital to what has heretofore been known among men by the name of religion. That has always been concerned, mainly, with the means for procuring spiritual help amid the trials and hardships that men must bear. If there are no such trials and hardships, if the seeming opposition of nature to man's desires is merely a disguised friendliness, then this quest for divine help is practically useless. Conceivably, of course, there may be something much better than religion, as that word is commonly understood. There may be an attitude of trust, of acquiescence, and of worship, which is distinctly higher than that attitude of petition which religion for the most part adopts. Regarding that, one only need say here that the culti-



vation of such a passive attitude hardly seems likely to demand, or to sustain, much of that kind of effort which has established the world's great religious institutions. People who only want to believe that things are perfectly right, as they are, will not require much of a church to support that faith. The conviction of the religious mind has always been that, in some respects, things were alarmingly wrong, and that it remained for humanity, with God's help, to try to make them right. The difficulty of this task has always disposed men who have seriously measured themselves against it to seek the assistance of higher powers. To me it seems quite improbable that organized religion can have any future under a radically different interpretation of existence. For that reason I hold Eucken's conviction of this unfriendliness of nature to be vital to the perpetuation of such religious institutions as we have received from the past.

And now, is nature our enemy or our friend? Are we what we are because nature has wrought upon us and for us, or because we have wrought for ourselves in despite of nature, and have forced her to yield, grudgingly, to our designs? One may say that nature is our best friend, being our enemy. That however is a subsequent reflection which ought to have no influence upon our decision of the main question. Are we to yield to nature as to a kindly Providence that is working out our destiny, or are we to resist nature as a power that knows nothing of what we call the highest good? Shall we suffer the winds and the currents of natural influence to carry us whither they will, or shall we so hold our rudder and trim our sail as to go in quite a different, even in the very opposite direction?

For my part, I see not how any man who ever kept a garden can rest under the illusion that nature is altogether his friend. She will grow his cabbages and his strawberries, it is true, if a sufficiently masterful hand is exerted to extort from her this boon. But she never suffers the man to forget that she would infinitely prefer to grow something else; and that, generally, something in which he takes no kind of interest. She has a special bug, characterized by phenomenal voracity and fecundity for every species of vegetation in which he takes delight, or if for the



moment she happens to be inadequately armed, she can and does invent the appropriate pest. She will bend all her energies to the production of what are for human purposes useless weeds, and she will choke every seed that the gardener plants, if she can. Nobody can have a garden, probably nobody ever did have a garden, without maintaining a ceaseless fight. I take this to be, in a general way, typical of our relations with the visible world surrounding us.

To be sure, Emerson wrote of the Pyramids and the abbey-churches of England that

"Nature gladly gave them place,  
Adopted them into her race,  
And granted them an equal date  
With Andes and with Ararat."

But he was perfectly aware of another side of nature, and could portray that side upon occasion in terms with which this poetry does not very well agree. It is much to be doubted whether nature ever really "adopts" any work of human hands. Wherever man has toiled to make visible his thought in wood or stone, nature following after him has done her best to obliterate his monuments. It takes her a long time to effect this in some instances, but she never surrenders the task.

It may be said that to represent the outward world as being actively hostile to human interests is as false as to suppose that all its doings bear conscious reference to the service of the human race; and this is of course true. The truth appears to be that for the most part nature is indifferent to man. In her operations she mostly overlooks us, betrays entire ignorance of our presence. How should it be otherwise, nature being, after all, only a vast machine, and incapable of recognizing us either in friendliness or hostility?

Man has an ideal of his own, which he certainly never learned from the world about him. Wherever it came from,—from a higher divine source or out of his own imagination,—it is something which nature knows not of. Her life runs in one channel, ours in another groove and she cares nothing either to further or to oppose what is dearest to our hearts.



But this very indifference makes her in multifold ways our antagonist. Her vast inertia is the dead weight that we have again and again to lift. Her blind insistence upon a way that is not ours creates a current from which it is often a work of huge labor to extricate ourselves. Niagara is doubtless innocent of all intent to hurl into the abyss a swimmer who has been caught in its stream. But, none the less, that swimmer must fight Niagara with all his strength, and must soon reach some rock to which he can cling, or his doom is sealed.

It seems to me the most idle of all play-acting to pretend that this necessity to struggle against the tendencies and influences of nature is merely an illusion. All great naturalists understand perfectly that nature is a non-moral realm; and surely never was attempt more vain—one might almost say more idiotic—than the endeavor to convert naturalism into a religion. In order to worship the God of nature, you have to shut your eyes to a host of things that are utterly repugnant to the spiritual sense.

Have we, at last, freed ourselves from necessity to believe in whatever beastliness the Old Testament contains, as if that were a true rendering of the law of God for men, only to take as our Bible what is sometimes called the "book of life," that manifestation of the outward world still more replete with instances and incidents wholly shocking to our spiritual sensibilities? Whatever it may mean, and however we may interpret the fact, between our spirits and many of the ways of nature there is, as Huxley said, "everlasting war." It is of course open to us to say that this is a state of things which God has himself designed because our souls have need of just this antagonist. But the faith which girds itself for such a conflict is widely different from the mere passivism, or quietism, which expects the whole process of deliverance to be wrought out by means of natural law. Eucken calls us back from that essentially pagan notion, into which the world has partially lapsed, to the stern but heroic idea of battle, which has hitherto inspired great Christian souls.

In the third place his thought is noteworthy from a religious point of view, because he points out the chasm that opens between man and nature, or perhaps a still deeper gulf, running also through man's own being, and dividing two sides of human nature from



each other. Paul's thought of the natural and the spiritual man is based upon no broader or more vital distinction than that which, according to Eucken's view, divides the higher from the lower types of human life. This is of religious importance, because as the division between man and nature has hitherto furnished the ground of appeal to a source of heavenly help, so now, without beholding some such deep cleft running through human nature itself, we are quite likely to be left without any good foundation on which to rest a heavenly hope. That is to say, what Eucken calls "mere man," or the "petty human," the man of flesh and sense—"man born of woman," to take the Biblical phrase—while, in a way, distinct from nature, is yet so much involved with the natural order that there is difficulty in providing for him any immortal destiny. This earthly being, bound by strong ties to the material world, is by many supposed to be all the man there is; and where that supposition rules, quite naturally the idea of immortality has been generally abandoned. Unless Eucken is right in his affirmation that spiritual life is quite another kind of being, I should say the whole world must be finally driven to that same denial.

It is not possible to enter here upon any justification of Eucken's idea; but two or three of his phrases may be quoted to indicate what it is. "It is clear," he says, "that in spiritual life we have to do, not with a mere addition to a life already existent, but with an essentially new life. Psychical life, which otherwise is merely subservient to, or accompanies, the process of nature, gains, when human life is at its highest, an independence and content of its own. It is something so new and peculiar that it can be understood only as a new stage of reality, or the emergence of a depth of the world which was formerly hidden." This new life, he says, has a claim "to form a new domain of existence, as opposed to nature; to introduce new realities, and goods, and assert them in opposition to those which reign in the natural order." This would be absurd, he confesses, if the spiritual were man's possession alone. "Its cosmic ambition would be an audacious folly, were it not that it has a cosmic life behind it, by whose power it is driven forward." This spiritual life, then, emerging from the depths of being into the heart of man, appears there a new order of creation;



as distinctly so as is man himself when compared with the animal kingdom beneath him. And being born into this world, like other preceding types of being, it can then only live by fighting its way to dominion.

The distinction between nature and man gives us a passive opposition which we are frequently required to face. The opposition of man against himself, owing to this division of his being, furnishes us with an active foe, who is capable of devilish cunning, of unending stubbornness, and unwearied industry. The tragic element, which a soft and relaxed age has been hoping to get rid of, thus comes back into life through Eucken's thought; as stern of feature as ever it stood in Greek drama, or in the theology of Calvin and Augustine. The world in which these stupendous antagonisms have their place is full of life and death contests; and for my part I believe Eucken does us good service in recalling us to that militant faith, which is the only faith that ever yet got much grip on the heart of the world. It is all very well to believe, if one can, that the red slayer is mistaken when he thinks he slays. For most of us, however, the appearance of slaughter is so wonderfully realistic that we shall prefer not to take unnecessary chances; and, at heart, we shall pretty surely despise a creed which treats life's struggle as if it were a kind of painted show.

If the man of today could be rid of his notion of some resistless power in the system of things which is sure to set right all his industrial and social and political wrongs,—a notion, I take it, which never had anything more than theoretical validity, and one that is contradicted by the whole weight of the world's experience,—this man of our time might better understand the debt he owes to those who, before him, have fought the good fight of faith. If he could be taught that the same battle which mankind has waged against venomous reptiles and savage beasts is to be continued in his own heart, we should have better assurance of the kind of man to make a "good soldier of Jesus Christ"; one who masters himself before he undertakes to master the world.

In all this Eucken's thought is new only in the sense that it presents a new balance and combination of elements that have long played their part in religious philosophy. Slight changes, however, in the arrangement of a set of ideas may produce as great



a difference in the result as is frequently effected by the slight variation of a chemical formula. We cannot shovel together, anyhow, the elements of chemistry to secure what we are after. They must be put together exactly right. The claim which I am inclined to make for Eucken is that he has combined the constituent parts of religious faith into a strong and effective union of ideas that is likely to have much influence over the thinking of the next generation of men.

One rather original contribution to the sum of these ideas he appears to have made. That is his account of the genesis of what, following the terminology of Paul, we may still call the spiritual man. Perhaps one reason why so many minds in our time have inclined to reject the spiritual man has been that they did not understand very well where he came from, and were unwilling to acknowledge him till he could furnish a better pedigree. Eucken indeed does not assume to tell us precisely where he comes from; but he sets forth the manner of his coming, in such reasonable terms, that perhaps the spiritual man may be now considered as sufficiently introduced even to high circles of academic thought. Another name for him, in Eucken's vocabulary, could be the Social man. For in a way, (though not in the political sense), Eucken is a tremendous socialist, and is never weary of pouring scorn and contempt on what he calls individualism.

There is one kind of man who lives altogether in and for himself. Other men are no more to him than so many trees, whose fruit he gathers. He may be learned or ignorant, coarse or refined, of high station or low; but always the predominant note of his character is selfishness. This is what Eucken calls "individualistic" living; and a school of thought which advocates or defends this manner of life he calls individualism. But there is another kind of man who lives mainly (and may live entirely) for others; the great object of whose thought and care is not what he can get out of existence, but the perfection of those relationships through which individuals come into possession of a common life. It is out of these social relationships, Eucken appears to think, that the higher life has its spring. Man by himself is an ignoble creature. Man among his fellows, thinking and acting for them as for himself, only then unlocks the hidden



resources of his own being and manifests a spirit that can be truly called divine.

This does not clear up the whole mystery of our spiritual life, and there is room for different theories, if we are to have a closer explanation. But it presents to us a very good natural origin of that division which we find within ourselves. It emphasizes what is far more important to us than mere speculative ideas, viz.: the great width of the chasm which really separates two orders of human life, and the utter impossibility that the two kinds of being can ever live at peace together. In the whole range of language we have no two words that come nearer to representing a polar difference than do "love" and "selfishness." No stable equilibrium of such opposite passions can ever be made. The entirely selfish man can be at peace with himself; so may the man who is altogether governed by love. But any mind into which both forces play will forever be torn by their contending might; and if one has ever fallen into those morbid states whose misery is that the mind cannot, for an instant, get away from itself, he is likely to feel that deliverance from this, even into that qualified and partial regard for things outside the self to which ordinary living has attained, is nothing short of a revolutionary change.

For myself, when I contrast the utterly selfish life with such an entirely unselfish example as we have in the mind of Christ, the difference appears to me as great as that between the lowest beginnings of organic life and its highest completed forms. Moreover, when I ask how it was that the supremely selfish being (which we may suppose the primitive man to have been) when he became conscious of his relationship to other beings like himself, found in his heart motives and desires prompting him to make the beginning of a kingdom of heaven, I seem to require some theory of divine incarnation for an answer. Until the tiger has been turned into a domestic animal, I shall never understand how, even by minute gradations, selfishness has been converted into love. It looks more like the gradual elimination of one set of motives and desires, and the substitution of others springing from a different source.

I long ago picked up a phrase in an English review which has



since grown, with me, to have no small significance. A writer of that day warned his readers against "the tendency of human nature to pulverize a fact and call it an explanation." Especially since "development" came in, the world is much disposed to think that all things are accounted for when the wide gaps between them are filled in by a multitude of short steps. Yet surely, if one has to walk it, a mile is still a mile, however it may be reduced to inches. The fact that humanity by slow degrees does rise from selfishness to love, really explains nothing of the mystery of the transformation; nor does it in any wise alter another fact of our experience, that between love and selfishness no truce can ever be made.

In this case the life of the higher nature demands the death of the lower as truly as the disruption or decay of the husk is required to set an imprisoned seed at liberty. In so far as we are ruled by selfishness, we have no place within the Kingdom of the Spirit, which is governed by a different law. If once we come to see, with Eucken, that human nature can no more endure, half-selfish and half-spiritual, than a nation could live half-slave and half-free, then we shall understand that the Master's counsels to stifle and cast out the lower self were not extreme, and that the exclamation of his apostle, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death!" was not the mere groan of a fanatic.

In Eucken's philosophy, then, we have mankind once more occupying that central place on the wide stage of the physical creation which ancient poetry and religion assigned to human beings; and we are thereby delivered from that feeling of the littleness and the worthlessness of our life which finds so much sad expression in modern literature. We have this child of Deity, inheritor of the freedom and the creative faculty belonging to the sons of God, set to do battle with oppositions that surround his steps; made to achieve greatness only by stout courage and tireless industry.

Above all, we have man forced to hard conflict with an inward foe; incapable of peace and rest save as he stands, at least for the moment, victorious over the tempter in his own heart.

All this may be held to reflect very closely the common consciousness of what life is, and therefore we have reason to say



that religion has by no means fallen out of date. Every prophet who only professes to show how God may be man's helper through these ways of difficulty and trial can be sure of some hearing and following, according to the boldness of his promises, though his offer be little more than an empty boast. And when one does really bring the might of the Spirit to their aid, mankind will be almost ready to worship him as if he were a god.



## FROUDE; OR THE HISTORIAN AS PREACHER

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We have had abundant evidence of late, if evidence were needed in the matter, that preaching is not of necessity confined to pulpits, nor a matter solely of the churches of the world. There are sermons which come from men of letters, as well as ministers, and from politicians who are genuine prophets. Whatever may be thought about the character of the sermons he delivers, and the nature of the texts from which he draws his inspiration, there can be no question of the fact that Theodore Roosevelt is essentially a preacher. His messages to Congress, which came with more than ministerial regularity and frequency, were essentially homiletical in form as well as hortatory in purpose, and his public addresses might well be collected under the Newmanesque title of *Political and Plain Sermons*.

In all of this there is nothing remarkable, unless it be in the fact that the individual chances to be a statesman and politician, instead of a poet, or a man of letters pure and simple. Most of us remember the question that Coleridge once put to his friend Charles Lamb, and the witty answer which he instantly received; but perhaps the repetition of it may be pardoned for the sake of those who have forgotten. "Charles," said the poet to his friend, referring to the days when he had been the minister of a Unitarian congregation,—“Charles, did you ever hear me preach?” “I never heard you do anything else,” was the ready although stuttering reply. The same might equally well be said of many another person who has either changed his profession or chosen from the first a wholly different calling. The man of letters, for example, is frequently a preacher. Carlyle was, who thundered and sent forth vivid lightnings against every form of folly and abuse that came beneath his eye. Abundant proof that the art critic and reformer often falls into the preaching habit is given



by Ruskin, who found a sermon in each stone of Venice, and a text in every letter of its long decay. The man of science indulges often in the art, and does it well, as Thomas Huxley made distinctly clear. Those of us who have visited the Wiertz Museum in Brussels, or remember Vereschagin's exhibition of his pictures, showing forth the horrors and barbarities of war, will be ready to confess that the artist also may be numbered in this class. And if men of letters, statesmen, scientists, and artists, with reformers generally, engage at times in a practice which is more especially the privilege of the minister and a function of the church, the same right may be broadly granted to one who has a clearer title to it than any of the others, and better reason for doing it both earnestly and well. I refer to the historian. In one sense it almost may be said that the historian is always preaching. He may not be aware of it himself, and he may endeavor to refrain from doing so; but the very facts which he marshals in his mind and sets down in his volumes insist on preaching for themselves. They prophesy above his head and without his leave. "History," as Dionysius long ago declared, "is philosophy teaching by example." It is hardly necessary to add that history is helped in this direction in some instances much more than in others, and, whether consciously or not, is often used to prove a point or illustrate some truth.

However all of this may be, I venture to call attention to a case in point where it was done with singular felicity and forcefulness, but with a generous freedom which has caused much misconception. There is perhaps no instance in modern times where the historian was at once so consummate and so constant, so brilliant and so bold a preacher as was Mr. Froude. In this fact alone I think, or at any rate in this fact chiefly, we discover the reason why he was often accused of carelessness and prejudice, and attacked for what he represented history as teaching. But before I go on to illustrate from his works themselves this homiletical or pulpit tendency, I wish to call attention to certain manifest and external features in the life and experience of Froude which serve upon the face of things to justify the point of view which I suggest.

There is reason enough to speak of Froude as a preacher when we remember that he belonged to a family of churchmen, and even



began life by taking orders himself. His father was rector of the church at Dartington in Devonshire and archdeacon of Totnes. He was a character in his way, this proud archdeacon, with a reputation of his own for clerical ability and worldly power. He combined in his person the authority of the churchman with the influence of the local magistrate and landholder, administering his church affairs on one day, and riding to hounds the next, the best mounted man in the field. He was a living prototype of Trollope's well-known character, Archdeacon Grantley in the "clerical series." It almost seems, indeed, that Trollope must have had in mind this Devon churchman when he drew the familiar portrait which stands out with such distinctness on the pages of *The Warden* and *Barchester Towers* and *The Last Chronicle of Barset*.

More important than the father, however, so far as early influence, lasting impression, and a guiding stimulus were concerned, was an elder brother,—the brilliant, the magnetic, the domineering, the conservative, the ascetic Hurrell Froude, who, though he died at thirty-three, left a deep mark upon the life and thought of the Church of England, leading up indeed to the great event in the middle of the 19th century which shook the Church to its very depths. Hurrell was the natural mentor of the youngest son of a large and memorable family, and he did not hesitate to make the fullest and completest use of the power which naturally belongs to an older brother. Moreover, the men who were his friends, and who became associated with him in the Oxford movement, were not without their influence. It was a very remarkable group which was gathered often at the rectory in Dartington, and the boy of twelve or fifteen years listened eagerly to the talk of Newman and Keble when they spent their holidays with his brother. The intimacy was close and confidential. Newman especially was a welcome visitor at the rectory, and he told the world in his *Letters and Correspondence* how one of his *Parochial and Plain Sermons* entitled "Scripture a Record of Human Sorrow" was suggested by the sight of blooming youth and high spirits in the Froude household which affected him suddenly with the thought of what changes were inevitably in store, and what hard discipline and trials.



When Anthony Froude went up to Oxford, therefore, he was naturally brought into close and very friendly touch with Newman. The influence of that great ecclesiastic could not fail to be distinct as well as deep. Froude followed naturally, though not without misgivings, the career marked out for him. Elected fellow of Exeter College after graduation, he took deacon's orders as was then required of all fellows, and he preached his first and only sermon proper in St. Mary's Church at Babbacombe, a few miles from his home at Dartington. Of the break that later came, of the abandonment of the clerical career, of the loss of belief, of the growth of heretical opinions and the publication of the *Nemesis of Faith*, a copy of which was publicly burned in the Hall of Exeter College, and of how he finally came to devote himself to history,—of things like these we need not speak. I have called attention to these scanty biographical details not only for the purpose of showing that Froude was from the first trained to be a preacher, but because the things he came in the end to preach through the medium of history were the very opposite of those which it was hoped that he would set forth as a churchman. In a rash and over-confident moment Hurrell Froude had told his younger brother that when Newman and Keble disagreed, then, but not till then, he might do his thinking for himself. What seemed to the young enthusiast utterly impossible in regard to his two most intimate friends was very soon to come to pass. To the astonishment and consternation of his followers and friends, Newman in 1845 slipped quietly into the Church of Rome, leaving Keble and the rest to pursue their way as rigid Church of England men. Before the unexpected actually came to pass, Anthony Froude had begun to claim his rights of independent thought, and, as often happens, there came about a strong reaction from the narrow tenets which had been impressed upon his mind. It was said of Macaulay that he wrote "his History to prove that God was always on the side of the Whigs." With an equal amount of truth, or untruth, it may be said that Froude wrote his glowing and dramatic History to prove that God was on the side of the Protestants.

The strength of his convictions, or, if you please, the vehemence of his prejudice, upon this point, is largely to be accounted for



by the way in which his beliefs took hold upon his mind. He had been trained to hold the very opposite position. To his older brother and his friends the Protestant Reformation, as it came to be worked out in England under Henry VIII, was a terrible and almost fatal error. They had no sympathy with the Puritan, none with the English martyrs in the time of Mary. "I am glad to know something of the Puritans," wrote Hurrell Froude to Keble upon one occasion, "as it gives me a greater right to hate Milton, and accounts for many of the things which disgusted me in his, not-in-my-sense-of-the-word, poetry. Also," he added, "I adore King Charles and Bishop Laud."

It was in such an atmosphere that the future author of *The History of England from the Fall of Wolsey to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada* was reared. When he began to think for himself, and read for himself, and finally to study and gather facts for himself, it was no wonder that he underwent a fierce reaction. What he came to see appeared all the more glorious and important, because he had worked his way onward toward it not without difficulty and not without pain and grievous misunderstandings and opposition. In dramatic contradiction, therefore, to what he had been brought up to believe, and had been urged by family and friends to preach in the pulpit, he set himself to proclaim in his History not the shame, but the endless glory, of the English Reformation; not the reasons for hating, but those for adoring, the Puritan; not the causes for believing that Henry VIII and Latimer and Cranmer were individuals to be reprobated and repented of, while Charles I and Laud were loved; but the very opposite of this,—namely, that Henry and his followers were the champions of English liberty and the actual saviours of the country. With the unerring eye of genius he chose for his theme the mighty drama when Protestant England under Henry and Elizabeth was clutched in a death-struggle with the Catholic forces, and from first to last we see the superior qualities of those who held to the Reformation position in religion. In the fight that goes on, the God of battles is on the side of the greater honesty and fervor of the Protestants and their devotion to truth and freedom. Froude himself has declared that Macaulay's unfairness to Cranmer, in the celebrated



review of Hallam's Constitutional History, first suggested to him the project of his work. It was thus for the purpose of contradicting falsehood, of setting the past in a truer light before his countrymen, and of saving them from the errors in which he had himself been trained, that he set to work.

Having chosen his theme and gathered with abundant pains and care a mass of original material, Froude claimed the right, which lately has been too often neglected,—partly perhaps because the spell of science rests upon our age, and partly because in large measure has the power itself been lost,—he claimed the right to make history interesting, and he believed that it was none the less true when interpreted and written as a drama. He called to his assistance the one great thing which he had gained of Newman and the Oriel atmosphere, a matchless style which never failed him, and which enabled him, as one of his fiercest and unfairest critics has confessed, when he came to certain central episodes, such as the sinking of Spain's great Armada, to rise "into a species of epic power."

"History and story," it has well been said, "are variations of the same word, and the historian who is a master of his art must be a story-teller." In this respect Froude was well calculated to meet the requirements of the "Gentle Reader," who claimed that history should be readable, and who described his feelings when he was set adrift on one of those bottomless seas of erudition called history, without human companionship, and only "writings, writings everywhere and not a page to read." The simple fact of the matter is that Froude did not write his histories merely to be referred to; he wrote them to be read. He did not design them to stand upon dusty book-shelves, but he prepared them for the hands of living men and women who wished to know about the past. To him the presentation of facts was almost as important as the facts themselves. And in this he was essentially Greek,—a lover of art as well as science, of beauty as well as accuracy. He was interested in history because of what it taught, and he was prejudiced enough to believe that it had many things to teach the coming generations. He was not warned off from his task, nor deterred from doing it well, by the modern claim "that history is a science and not a province



of literature; that the time has not yet come to draw any conclusions or to summarize any tendencies; that picturesque narrative is an offence against the spirit of truth." Far from it. He agreed rather with Professor Seeley, that "we do not so much want history explained after the manner of science as we want it portrayed and interpreted after the manner of literature." He believed, indeed, with a present-day historian of wide repute<sup>1</sup> that "the assembling of details is antiquarian; the truth of general effect alone is historical. To produce the latter is masterly; the former is mechanical investigation, and its reproduction for the laity misleads far more frequently than it guides." It is the business and the privilege of the historian, quite as much as it is the business and privilege of the preacher, to point a moral and adorn a tale; and the moral is not the less sound for being pointed gracefully and well, nor the tale less accurate and faithful for being draped in the adornment of splendid rhetoric and rich description. History is essentially a form of eloquence. It requires imagination; and it cannot make us understand until it makes us *see* things. In this respect Froude was essentially a master, and seldom if ever has he been surpassed in insight and power to depict the past. He belongs to the class of Prescott and of Parkman, of Motley and of Macaulay, men who have "displayed the romantic side of history, and have discovered the possibilities of language in rendering its records glowing and fascinating without departing from veracity." Nevertheless it was just because Froude knew and used the possibilities of the English language that he came to be so freely and frequently accused of departing from veracity.

Into the question of Froude's reliability, however, I have no wish, nor perhaps am I equipped, to enter. It ought to be said, however, that since the charges against him have been traced to their turbulent and angry source, the prejudices that once prevailed have tended silently to pass away. According to Edmund Gosse, in his *History of English Literature*,<sup>2</sup> Freeman, who was a firm high-churchman, could never forgive his brilliant

<sup>1</sup> W. M. Sloane, *Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1908, p. 280.

<sup>2</sup> *Short History of Modern English Literature*, p. 373.



rival for abandoning the party in the old Oxford days. He sat at his literary elbow like some gigantic Nemesis for more than thirty years, magnifying every fault, and exaggerating every error in his historical writings, though often falling into gross errors himself in the process. His criticisms for the most part were anonymous, but were always written with rancor and abuse. "Any stick," he once declared, "was good enough with which to belabor Froude." Freeman at his gentlest was never too refined, and at his harshest became insulting. He was introduced in public once as "the historian who has done so much to reveal to us the rude manners of our ancestors."

It must not be inferred from this, however, that Froude was free from errors, or beyond the range of criticism. He was a pioneer, and it has been truly said of him that "probably no previous historian has incorporated so much unpublished material in his work."<sup>3</sup> His authorities for the most part were in manuscript. They were written in five languages, and filled nine hundred volumes. The most precious of them were in the little village of Simancas in Spain, which he was the first to explore. He copied masses of documents which even a Spaniard would have found it difficult to read, and these copies were later given to the British Museum, where they may now be seen. I looked them through a few months since, and in the full witness they give to his industry they certainly disprove Green's description of him as an indolent man. I hold no brief for Froude's inerrancy, however, and I would not for a moment claim that he did not make mistakes, it may be serious ones. I assert, however, that his errors have been grievously exaggerated, and that the greatest of all historical writers, since history began, have not escaped a similar charge. Carlyle, for instance, was accused of misrepresenting events in the French Revolution, and all of us know how severely Bancroft suffered in the old days. Professor Sloane has called to mind an instance of the ill-deserved censure in the latter case. When New Jersey was erecting the battle monument at Trenton, and proposed on the authority of Bancroft's pages to inscribe on its base Lord George Germain's terse words about "that unhappy affair which has blasted all our hopes,"

<sup>3</sup> Dictionary of National Biography, Supplement, Vol. ii, p. 257.



it was a Boston historian who dryly remarked in a letter that this was "one of the things Bancroft thought ought to have been said, but there was no proof that it ever *was* said." The phrase so calmly dismissed as invention was promptly found by a friendly fellow-student of the historian in the pages of Parliamentary debates.

I can give a similar incident in regard to Froude, which will show at once how falsely he was sometimes judged, and how unfairly. Not long ago I was talking with a distinguished historical writer, who is also one of the most careful. The discussion turned on Froude, and he offered to give me an instance of his errors, inaccuracy and unscrupulous methods. In his sketch of *Cæsar*, he said, Froude tells us that after the battle of Pharsalia, Cæsar burned all Pompey's letters without reading them, not wishing to learn unpleasant things about his friends at home. "Now that statement," said my friend, "is a very interesting one; but there is absolutely no foundation for it. I have consulted Mommsen, and last year when I was in Rome I asked some learned men of my acquaintance if they could tell me Froude's authority. They could not, the fact being that he undoubtedly made it up out of whole cloth." As a matter of fact, however, I soon discovered the entire incident, set down as Froude related it, in the pages of Dio Cassius. My friend, to whom I wrote, replied that "one swallow does not make a summer," and that actual instances could probably be found of mistakes that Froude had fallen into. And so no doubt they could. My only contention is that justice never has been done him, and that he was loaded down unfairly from the first with a reputation for carelessness. The judgments, however, that time often renders in respects like these are as interesting as any judgments that are handed down to us in silence, and they often have all the dramatic features of what is anomalous and paradoxical. A good example of what I mean may be found in the case of Herodotus *vs.* his detractors. Macaulay, for instance, in his brilliant and interesting essay upon History, did not hesitate to pass the most sweeping judgment on the recognized father of this branch of literature. "At the distance of three and twenty centuries," he wrote, "we feel for him the same sort of pitying fondness which Fontaine and Gay are said



to have inspired in society. He has written an incomparable book. He has written something better perhaps than the best history; but he has not written a good history. He is, from the first to the last chapter, an inventor. We do not here refer," he goes on to say, "merely to those gross fictions with which he has been reproached by the critics of later times. We speak of that coloring which is equally diffused over the whole narrative, and which perpetually leaves the most sagacious reader in doubt what to reject and what to receive. The most authentic parts of his work bear the same relation to his wildest legends which Henry V bears to the Tempest."

Thus the great Macaulay on the careless and credulous Herodotus! Very steadily, however, since the words were written, the case has gone against the facile Englishman and in favor of the ancient Greek. Careful study and a wider knowledge of ancient times and people have gone, I believe, to show that much which was tossed aside as fiction in Herodotus was actual fact, while Macaulay's own history has gradually become discredited, because of its partisan judgment and its perpetual inaccuracy.

The fact of the matter is that there are two great kinds of history, and probably there always will be. The writing of history, in short, is not unlike the art of painting. In both great spheres there are distinct and opposing schools. There are the artists who make a science of detail, and there are those who make a science of *impression*, and neither school is ever wholly accurate, nor can it hope to be.

Now Froude was emphatically an impressionist and a color-schemist. He painted scenes in a vivid and expressive way, and he loved a dramatic situation. He made the most of a striking episode, and the only difference between himself and other writers lay in the fact that where others failed, or did but fairly well, he set a masterpiece before the reader's mind. Froude may have hated correcting proof, as Mr. Birrell has declared,<sup>4</sup> and he was doubtless careless in the copying of manuscript; but he had a veritable passion for digging into the records of the past, and he never wearied in his task of making real the men and women whom he found there. His History may live to be corrected, and

<sup>4</sup> Augustine Birrell, *Essays and Addresses*, p. 163.



his portraits to become retouched; but at least they are likely to live and to be remembered, which is more than can be said of the writings of many of those who delighted to abuse him.

From this digression, however, which has not been wholly vain if it has removed from our minds some portion of inherited prejudices, let us come back to our proper subject,—the preaching qualities of this historian.

Froude's theme, as we have seen, was the Protestant Reformation and the course it ran in England. His text was substantially this, that "the Reformation was the hinge on which all modern history turned." The Reformation, however, as he saw it, was no simple contest between rival creeds and dogmas; it rather was a wide revolt of the laity against the clergy, of the people against a corrupt and tyrannous form of government, of the human mind against restrictions on the native right of independent judgment. As his biographer, Mr. Herbert Paul, reminds us, Froude believed "the Church of Rome to have been the enemy of human freedom under British independence," and in his opinion the "reformers alike in England, in France, and in Germany were fighting for truth, honesty, and private judgment, against priestcraft and ecclesiastical tyranny." He knew too well, from what he had himself been taught, that "the reformers had been calumniated," and it seemed to him that "their services were in danger of being forgotten, and that the modern attempt to ignore the Reformation was not only unhistorical but disingenuous." In this belief he was very far from being alone. Visitors to Oxford will remember that one of the most beautiful of its many striking memorials is the martyrs' monument, opposite Balliol College, near the place where Cranmer, Ridley, and Latimer were burned. The monument, which was designed by Sir G. G. Scott, was erected in 1841, and was intended as a public dissent from the disparagement which had been cast by the leaders of the Oxford movement on the work and influence of the English reformers. It stands there as a witness, raised by scholars and lovers of historical justice, to the worth of men who had laid down their lives in devotion to a mighty cause. What was accomplished there in bronze and marble, Froude undertook to do in literature, and his *History* is equally a monument in honor of the martyrs,



and likewise of the countless men and women, known and unknown, who bore the brunt of the mighty battle for freedom of thought and for national religious independence.

It would be idle to undertake to claim for Froude what he never undertook to claim for himself,—an absence of prejudice. “I do not pretend,” he wrote long after his *History* had become a classic, “to be impartial. I believe the Reformation to have been the greatest incident in English history; the root and source of the expansive force which has spread the Anglo-Saxon race over the globe and imprinted the English genius and character on the constitution of mankind.” In this respect again he meets in the fullest way the demands of the Gentle Reader. “I have had enough of this,” says Mr. Crothers, in his inimitable way, as regards one of our modern scientific historians who has no sympathy and ventures to express no judgments. “I have had enough of this,” referring to the Civil War in England. “What I want to know is, what it is all about, and which side on the whole has the right of it. Which side are you on? Are you a Roundhead or a Cavalier? Are your sympathies with the Whigs or the Tories? . . . It’s all in confidence; speak out as one gentleman to another under a friendly roof! What do you think about it? No matter if you make a mistake or two, I’ll forget most that you say anyway. All that I care for is to get the gist of the matter.”

Now that is just what Froude did. He spoke out. He said what he thought, and he gave the gist of the entire matter in graphic and most forceful words. He saw distinctly that the question which was fought out after the fall of Wolsey and finally settled by the defeat of Philip’s Great Armada was the question whether England should be bond or free, stagnant or progressive, decadent or resurgent. In the great struggle which ensued before that question was finally settled, men took opposite sides, and took them with a will. Some of the best men of that day, or of any day, took the wrong side, while certain other men whose influence and character never had been rightly weighed, distinctly took the right side. So Froude at least believed. And he not only said so, but he set himself to prove it, and very happily the events of history were on his side. The facts bore out his



theory, and the right men and the nobler principles secured the victory which has never since been lost. There can be no doubt that he went too far in acting as the champion of Henry VIII. He would have accomplished more in this direction, as John Fiske well declared, "if he had not tried to do so much." It was a mighty thing, however, to accomplish anything at all, and whether the better and the truer view was suggested to him by Carlyle or not is a matter of very little consequence. The fact remains that what Carlyle himself accomplished in so great a way for Cromwell, his friend and disciple accomplished in a smaller way for a much less noble and attractive character. It was impossible to whitewash Henry completely; but it was much, at least, to set him in a whiter and a clearer light.

We have seen what Froude's text was, and what the general subject of his long discourse. It now remains to consider how he developed and carried through his theme, and what the special truths were that he took delight in emphasizing.

1. Chief among such truths was the value and the surpassing might of vigorous and independent manhood. Like Carlyle, to whom the early volumes of the *History* were referred for criticism and advice, Froude dearly loved to deal with men, and more especially with men of action,—men who did things and engaged in great heroic feats. These were the kind of men which his native Devonshire had produced in great abundance, and in youth he had been fed upon the tales of what they mightily accomplished. Moreover, he freely accepted the dictum, and worked upon it, that "history is the quintessence of many biographies." He believed that history is essentially a drama and that to be written successfully it must be written in dramatic fashion. A drama, however, depends upon the movements and positions, the beliefs and undertakings, of its actors. It peoples the stage with living men and actual women. In accomplishing this Froude was assisted by his marvellous imaginative powers. He was possessed of insight; that is of historical insight. He had the faculty, without which true history never can be written, of living in the age with which he dealt. He touched elbows with the people of past times and succeeded to a wonderful degree in seeing with their eyes and thinking their thoughts. He was with a boat-



man in his wherry on the Thames that summer afternoon when the "thunder cloud drew down over London, and the storm broke which destroyed St. Paul's." Amidst the roar of the thunder he saw a jagged line of lightning "touch for an instant the highest point of the proud cathedral. Pale tongues of fire flickered out into a coronet of light, and very soon the whole spire, the envy of the Christian world, from the tower wall to the summit, was a gigantic pyramid of flame."

At another time, with three hundred knights and gentlemen, he had been admitted to the hall of Fotheringay Castle to witness the execution of the unfortunate Mary Stuart. He sees her as she descends the great staircase to the hall, leaning on the arm of an officer of the guard. "The tables and forms had been removed," he notices, "and a great wood fire was blazing in the chimney. The Queen of Scots as she swept in seemed as if coming to take part in some solemn pageant. Not a muscle of her face could be seen to quiver. She ascended the scaffold with absolute composure, looked round her smiling, and sat down."

At still another time, he was with the monks in the chapel of the Charter-house when they prepared themselves with unobtrusive nobleness to die. Not less beautiful "they seemed to him in their resolution, not less deserving the remembrance of mankind, than those three hundred who in the summer morning sat combing their golden hair in the passes of Thermopylae." He could not "regret their cause, as there *is* no cause for which any man can more nobly suffer than to witness that it is better for him to die than to speak words which he does not mean."

There are those among historians who make it clear that what they care for most is the idle gossip of history,—the trivial events, the passing superstitions, the thoughts and sayings of the stable, the kitchen, and the court. Others, again, and among them the greatest and most searching writers, are interested more especially in social and industrial conditions and the slow development of thought. But Froude, in the first chapter of the first of his twelve long volumes, made it reasonably clear that his chief concern was to be with the sturdy men of his native land and the deeds they sturdily performed in fighting for religious freedom. In this respect he



reached a climax when he came to tell the story of the mighty naval duel between Spain and England, in which Drake, and Hawkins, and Sir Walter Raleigh sailed forth to destroy the clumsy but almost countless vessels of the cruel Philip. It was just the kind of theme that suited best the genius of this brilliant descriptive writer, for Froude was a sailor from his youth, and loved the sea as he loved nothing else, unless it were his native Devonshire.

It was not by chance that an older brother made himself one of the foremost naval authorities in England, for the Froudes were a boating family, and the opportunity was near at hand, as the River Dart flowed near the door of the quiet rectory, while the sea was not far off. Even the ritualistic Hurrell could not resist its charm, and he complained in his diary that the thought of it distracted him beyond measure in his prayers. "Do you remember," he wrote Keble, "the southwesterly waves roaring round 'the Prawle' after our stern, and the little crisp breakers that we went through when you cruised with us off Dartmouth harbor?" This passion for the sea, however, was strongest of all with the youngest of the brothers, and he once wrote to a friend that his "highest realization of human felicity would be to wander round the world in a hundred-ton schooner."

With passionate fervor, therefore, as well as intimate knowledge of the elements with which he dealt, he wrote the graphic story of the famous sea-fight, and through it all you feel the breezes as they blew across the swaying decks and fanned the cheeks of those mighty men who sailed from Plymouth Harbor to fight the battle of their Queen. It was no wonder that when the story had been told the historian felt his task was finished. It was the crowning feat of sixteenth-century manhood; or, as he himself expressed it, "It was the sermon which completed the conversion of the English nation and transformed the Catholics into Anglicans."

2. But if Froude believed above all things else in manhood and preached the need and value of strong and resolute and fearless and liberty-loving men, he also believed in a power that is superior to men and women and orders their affairs. Although his faith in early life had undergone a shock, and, guided by the teachings of Carlyle he lost his hold on dogmatic religion, he



never ceased to believe in the presence of a Higher Power which guides men in their work.

"Justice and truth," he once declared, "alone endure and live. Injustice and falsehood may be long-lived; but doomsday comes to them at last, in French Revolutions and other terrible ways." To him there was, if men would only listen, "a Voice forever sounding across the centuries the laws of right and wrong." It came to be his task as an historian to interpret the accents of that voice, and to spell the words it spoke in a mighty human crisis. "Religion," he explained in one connection, and the words are very strikingly a preacher's words,—“Religion is the attitude of reverence in which noble-minded people instinctively place themselves towards the Unknown Power which made man and his dwelling-place. It is the natural accompaniment of their lives, the sanctification of their actions and their acquirements. It is what gives to man in the midst of the rest of creation his special elevation and dignity. Accompanying our race as it has done from the cradle of civilization, it has grown with our growth, it has expanded with the expansion of knowledge, subject only to the condition that when errors have been incorporated into religious systems, they have been exceptionally tenacious of their ground. Rituals and creeds have become so priceless when once accepted that it has been held sacrilege to touch them. They have been guarded by superstition and sealed against change by anathema. The eternal nature of the Object of our reverence has been attributed to the forms under which it has been adored, and, unable notwithstanding to escape the changes which the development of knowledge imposes upon it, religion has advanced, not by easy and natural transitions, but by successive revolutions, violent leaps, spasmodic and passionate convulsions. Piety, the twin brother of science, tends at such times to be the guardian of error. Love of truth is forced into unnatural hostility with the virtue which is only second to it, and then come those trying periods of human history, when devotion and intelligence appear to be opposed, and the metal of which men and nations are composed is submitted to a crucial test. Those who adhere at all costs to truth, who cling to her though she lead them into the wilderness, find beyond it a promised land where all that they sacrificed is restored to them.”<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Volume xii, pp. 535-6.



3. As these words suggest, with the emphasis they lay upon the dangerous tenacity of ritual and creed, the religion which Froude believed in and proclaimed was a religion of toleration and kindness. History taught him, and he used the facts of history to proclaim, the dangers of departing from that "pure religion" and undefiled of trust and love, of reverence and mercy, which was set forth in the gospels. "Such a creed," he declared in one connection, "had it remained as it came from its Founder, would have changed the aspect of the earth. . . . It would not have quarrelled over words and forms. It would have accepted the righteous act whether the doer of it preferred Paul or Cephas. In that Religion hate would have no place, for love, which is hate's opposite, was its principle; nor could any cruel passion have found its sanction where each emotion was required to resolve itself into charity.

"But the rules of life as delivered in the Gospel were too simple and too difficult. . . . God gave the Gospel, the father of lies invented theology. . . . By their fruits ye shall know them. Through Christ came charity and mercy. From theology came strife and hatred, and that fatal root of bitterness which the Lord spoke Himself in the mournful prophecy, that He had not come to send peace on earth, but a sword. When His name and His words had been preached for fifteen centuries, there were none found who could tolerate difference of opinion on the operation of Baptism, or on the nature of His presence in the Eucharist; none, or at least none but the hard-hearted children of the world. The more religious any man was the more eager was he to put away by fire and sword all those whose convictions differed from his own. The Reformation was the beginning of a new order of things."<sup>6</sup>

Those are biting and sarcastic words; and they are the words of a man whose heart and conscience were aflame with the tragic facts of intolerance and bigotry, and who wished to proclaim these facts from the pulpit page of history.

4. Again, however, and even more conspicuously, he believed in freedom,—freedom of thought, freedom of action, and freedom of religious worship. He believed in the thorough-going separation of church and state, and was never tired of laying

<sup>6</sup> Volume ix, pp. 301-3.



emphasis upon the obstacles and dangers of every form of ecclesiastical dictation. It is in this connection, much more, so far as I have found, than in any other, that he throws aside all possible disguise and preaches with persistent fervor. There can be no better instances of this than occur in the descriptive passages which tell of the martyrs' deaths at Oxford. What, for instance, could flavor more distinctly of the pulpit than the following: "Latimer was then introduced—eighty years old now—dressed in an old thread-bare gown of Bristol frieze, a handkerchief on his head with a night-cap over it, and over that again another cap, with two broad flaps buttoned under the chin. A leather belt was round his waist, to which a Testament was attached; his spectacles, without a case, hung from his neck. So stood the greatest man perhaps then living in the world, a prisoner on his trial, waiting to be condemned to death by men professing to be the ministers of God. As it was in the day of the prophets, so it was in the Son of man's day; as it was in the days of the Son of man, so was it in the Reformers' day; as it was in the days of the Reformers, so will it be to the end, so long and so far as a class of men are permitted to hold power, who call themselves the commissioned and authoritative teachers of truth."<sup>7</sup>

The same characteristics vividly appear when the death of Cranmer is described. Biblical allusions came almost as easily and naturally to Froude's mind as they came to the mind of Ruskin, and he used them with the preacher's freedom. "So perished Cranmer. He was brought out, with the eyes of his soul blinded, to make sport for his enemies, and in his death he brought upon them a wider destruction than he had effected by his teaching while alive. Had they been contented to accept the recantation, they would have left the Archbishop to die broken-hearted, pointed at by the finger of pitying scorn; and the Reformation would have been disgraced in its champion. They were tempted, by an evil spirit of revenge, into an act unsanctioned even by their own bloody laws; and they gave him an opportunity of redeeming his fame, and of writing his name in the roll of martyrs. The worth of a man must be measured by his life, not by his

<sup>7</sup> Volume vi, p. 383.



failures under a single and peculiar trial. The Apostle, though forewarned, denied his Master on the first alarm of danger; yet the Master who knew his nature in its strength and its infirmity, chose him for the rock on which He would build His Church."<sup>8</sup>

I could give other instances where, between his graceful periods and sweeping sentences, we catch clear echoes of the pulpit. But I content myself with these.

And so we leave this prince among the men who have aided history in the truths it cannot help but preach. Often hasty in his judgments, mistaken doubtless in certain of his statements, and swayed by prejudices which he took small pains to hide, he none the less was always brilliant, stimulating, and instructive in his treatment of the things concerning which he wrote. It has well been said of him that "Whether for felicity of diction or for vividness of presentation, he belongs indisputably to the company of the Immortals." Because he considered the presentation of facts almost as important as the facts themselves, and gave in smooth and interesting words the substance of some dull and dry original, it has been assumed of him unfairly that he was careless in his methods and indifferent to "the accidents of truth." But the principle which he laid down for himself at the outset of his work, and the ideal to which he struggled to be true, lacked nothing either in soundness or in height. "It is not," he wrote at the close of the first volume of the History, after clearing the ground for his discourse, "it is not for the historian to balance advantages. His duty is with facts."

<sup>8</sup> Volume vi, pp. 429-30.



### THE "STANDARD BIBLE DICTIONARY"<sup>1</sup>

This dictionary has been prepared because Hastings's Dictionary of the Bible and the Encyclopaedia Biblica have been found too "discursive" for handy use. It is intended for educated ministers, who "have not always the leisure to enter into a discursive presentation of critical research"; for Sunday-school teachers and workers; and for intelligent laymen interested in Bible study. To serve such readers, the dictionary should be accurate but not technical; "it should be up to the day in its information, but not so discursive as to burden its pages with the pedantry of undigested facts."

There is undoubtedly a place for a dictionary of the Bible in one volume—otherwise we should not have been blessed with three of them in one year, not to mention the resuscitation of another. Whether such a work can be made to serve the needs of so varied a constituency may, however, be doubted. The educated minister who wants seriously to study a subject will often find this dictionary insufficient in itself, and, through the absence of any systematic indication of the literature, useless as a guide to further inquiry. The ordinary Sunday-school teacher or "intelligent layman," on the other hand, will find it too big and repellently learned. Suppose, for example, that such a reader consults the article on Greek and Roman Idolatry; he will be edified to learn that "the old sacred tree-trunks . . . and stones, usually of meteoric origin, were called *ζόαα* [*sic*], and these *ζόαα* [*sic*] continued to be the real cult object," etc.; also that a sacred stone set up under a sacred tree "was called a *βαίτυλος* by the Greeks." The layman who, asking for bread, is given a stone like this may be tempted to murmur "pedantry," while those who can read the Greek, after tacitly correcting the mis-

<sup>1</sup>A Standard Bible Dictionary, designed as a comprehensive guide to the Scriptures, embracing their languages, literature, history, biography, manners and customs, and their theology. Edited by M. W. Jacobus, E. E. Nourse, and A. C. Zenos, in association with American, British, and German scholars. Large 8vo, pp. 920. New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company. 1909.



prints, will justly complain that no references to Greek authors are given in support of assertions about the names of sacred stones which seem to have no warrant in usage.

In the Standard Dictionary, as in the new Hastings, the one-volume minister has been more in the mind of the authors and editors than the layman. A dictionary specially adapted to Sunday-school teachers and ordinary readers of the Bible is still to be made.

Taking the work as a short cut to information for busy ministers, it is to be said at once that it will answer this purpose very well. The selection of entry-titles is a combination of the dictionary and the encyclopaedia principles, such subjects as Agriculture, Artisan Life, Trade and Commerce, Dress and Ornaments, Burial and Burial Customs, Law, Crimes and Punishments, Marriage and Divorce, Family, etc., being treated in comprehensive articles with references from the natural dictionary entries. The concordance basis results in some omissions. Thus the emperors Tiberius and Claudius are included, but there is no article on Nero because his name does not happen to occur in the New Testament; though in the New Testament history Nero is a much more important figure than either of the others, and is more frequently referred to. The concordance is not, however, responsible for the absence of "Caesar," under which head a reader of Acts 25 would look for an answer to the question who the emperor was to whom Paul appealed.

There are more serious faults of omission than these. The religions of the Greek and Roman world in the first century of the Christian era are of at least as much importance to the understanding of the New Testament as Semitic religion to that of the Old Testament. There is promise in the preface of an article on the subject; but all that we find is one—mainly irrelevant—on Greek and Roman Idolatry. The reader will look in vain for an article on Judaism at the beginning of the Christian era. To make the matter worse, the article Pharisees is almost wholly given up to the external history of the sect, with no account of their teachings; the few sentences on their religious character are altogether unsatisfactory. The articles on Biblical theology (with a few exceptions, such as Eschatology) entirely ignore con-



temporary Jewish thought. A striking example is the article on God (by W. D. Mackenzie): after setting forth the Old Testament "doctrine" of God—with no reference even to the later development, as represented, for example, in Daniel—the author proceeds: "When we pass to the N T we find ourselves in a new world made for us by a new religion. The change is due to the creative personality of Jesus Christ." Biblical ethics is also a subject which would seem to fall properly within the scope of a Bible dictionary. Suppose an inquirer to ask, What are the standards and motives of moral conduct in the Old Testament or the New, and how are the latter related to Jewish teaching? why should he not find information on this point in the dictionary as well as, say, on Sacrifice or on Magic? Here, again, the lack of a connected treatment is not made good under special topics: there is no article on Retribution; Reward is a barren list of Hebrew and Greek words; Sin and Righteousness are theological disquisitions. It is the signal fault of Bible dictionaries—not peculiar to this one—that they conscientiously tithe the mint, anise, and cumin of antiquities to the comparative neglect of weightier matters; and the disproportion is the more serious the smaller the scale of the work. In the present volume there are also many articles which are mere gleanings from the concordance (see, e.g., Favor, Light, Path, Prince, etc.), of no discernible use unless to the student of the Hebrew or Greek text, who presumably keeps concordances of his own.

The authors are chiefly Americans, but there are several well-known foreign contributors. Nowack writes on various archaeological subjects; Guthe furnishes the long article on Palestine, and on Marriage and Divorce; v. Dobschütz on the New Testament Text; Lake on the New Testament Canon; Driver on Chronicles and on Jeremiah; König on the Old Testament Canon and on Isaiah; James Denney on Jesus Christ and on Paul; Doctor Post, of Beirut, on Diseases and Remedies, etc. Among the American contributors special mention may be made of articles by McCurdy on Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, Israel, Semitic Religion; by J. R. S. Sterrett on Asia Minor, and on many subjects in the field of New Testament geography and Greek and Roman history and antiquities; Paton on Jerusalem and on the



Old Testament Text; W. D. Mackenzie on subjects in Biblical theology (from the theological rather than the historical point of view). A large part of the articles have been written by the three editors: Jacobus has dealt chiefly with the New Testament literature and kindred subjects; Nourse furnishes most of the articles on the books of the Old Testament and many on biographical and archaeological subjects; Zenos's astounding versatility is displayed in a vast number of articles in the most diverse fields.

In general the articles display competent scholarship; some of them are by men of acknowledged mastery in their domain. Some, however, bear the mark of hasty compilation, and are afflicted with a corresponding inaccuracy. For example, on page 88, we are told that the Apocalypse of Baruch was discovered and published in a Latin translation in 1866, "and later in a more primitive Syriac text in 1871," the fact being that Ceriani's Latin of 1866 was his own translation of the Syriac manuscript which he edited in 1871; on page 868 it is asserted that in later Judaism two tithes were paid "of the product of both soil and cattle." Novel or eccentric opinions are sometimes incautiously accepted, as when Klostermann's unhappy conceit that *Aceldama* (Ἀκελδαμαχ), Acts 1 19, is the transliteration of an Aramaic word meaning 'field of sleep' (cemetery), not 'field of blood' (Mt. 27 8 Acts 1 19), is given as the true explanation of the name.

An example of another kind is the article on the Phasisees (see especially p. 667 B): "They recognized God not only as a law-giver, but also as loving Israel, and along with their *halākōth* they developed a theory of the 'evil impulse' . . . and a code of morality, known as the 'Two Ways,' which appears later in the *Didache*." "With Him [Jesus], God was the Father, to be obeyed through love; according to the Pharisees, God was primarily the Law-giver, to be obeyed through fear (Gal. 2 3-5, 5 1, 6 13; Rom. 8 14; 2 John 1 7)." The reader will find it instructive to look up these references, especially those in Galatians; it may occur to him to ask why the Christian opposition to Paul's antinomianism should be alleged to show how the Pharisees thought of God.



If there had been an article on Father in Heaven—why is there not?—or if the article on the Lord's Prayer had been less superficial, it would have appeared that the conception of God as the heavenly Father was by no means specifically Christian; if in the article Prayer any notice had been taken of Jewish custom, it would be plain that the Jew who repeated Deut. 6 4 ff.—“Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart,” etc.—before his morning and evening prayers, taking upon himself thus “the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven” before “the yoke of the commandments”—that is, acknowledging the constitutive obligation of religion before its specific duties—was not unmindful of the fact that the essence of the religious relation of man to God is love; if ethics had found any place in the dictionary, it would probably have been noted that the rabbis insistently taught that God should not be served with the thought of reward, nor with any self-regarding motive, but “for his own sake.”

There are many well-made and generally well-chosen illustrations in line and in half-tone; the collection of modern Palestinian agricultural implements, household utensils, musical instruments, etc., at Hartford Seminary has been largely drawn upon. For the benefit of a second edition it may be pointed out that the specimen of Samaritan script on page 28 is upside down; to most users of the dictionary it is doubtless as profitable that way as any other.

The editors of the one-volume Hastings decline as hopeless the attempt to indicate the English pronunciation of Old Testament names; in the volume before us the pronunciations are given on the authority of the Standard Dictionary. It must be understood, however, that these pronunciations frequently do not represent usage, but arbitrary rules or perilous analogies; thus, the reader may have his choice among three ways of pronouncing Ittai—every possible way except the obviously right one.

The transliteration of Hebrew words (“slightly (!) different from that in general use”) aims “to enable the English reader to understand, as easily as possible, how the Hebrew words should be pronounced.” We should be surprised if the “English reader” could make head or tail out of this perversely complicated system; it may be some consolation in his defeat to know that he has



escaped learning how to mispronounce Hebrew horribly. Like the American Revisers, whose self-styled Standard American Edition with its "Jehovah" it follows, the Dictionary seems to have a leaning "to gods whom they know not, to new gods that came newly up." The article Jehovah explains that the Hebrew name is written *y<sup>e</sup>hōwāh*, "but properly *yāhweh*." This new god is not the invention of the printer's devil, for the name occurs repeatedly (see, e.g., pp. 296, 389, 390, 571 f.), and an attempt is even made to do it into Hebrew characters, which, however, gets no nearer to it than *Yohweh*. The latter is at least an imaginable Hebrew form: according to one popular interpretation of Jahveh, "He who brings into existence," *Johveh* would be "the god who is brought into existence"—by dictionary makers!

The publisher's part of the work is excellently done; the print is good, and typographical devices to facilitate reference are skillfully employed. A few misprints have escaped the corrector's eye: *Baba Megilla*, *Baba Sabbath*, etc. (p. 600 and elsewhere); Sybilline Oracles (p. 41); Gambinius (p. 156). *Mēhōl* (circumciser, p. 136) and *hōbhrē shāmayīm* (p. 71, "the Hebrew word for astrologers") are probably not the fault of the proof-reader.

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